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In the mid-1940s, my father migrated to the United States from 
Uruguay. He met and married my mother (a Dominican immigrant) in 
New York City and never returned home again while his parents were 
living. His contacts with his family were infrequent, consisting only of 
a letter or two each year. In contrast to his separation from his family 
60 years ago, my one-year sabbatical leave in Uruguay hardly feels so 
distant. Thanks to e-mail, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and digi-
tal photography, my parents don’t miss a thing, and my husband and I 
and our 11-year-old daughter get to keep up with their daily lives, too. 
They know the details of each apartment we looked at before deciding 
on one, and we get the blow-by-blow on the balcony reconstruction go-
ing on at their condominium in Florida. Once a day or so we converse 
using Skype, an Internet telephony network, and if they are diligent 
about reading my husband’s blog they will even get to see pictures of 
the chivitos (a typical Uruguayan sandwich) we ate for lunch today.
While it certainly is not the case that all migrants have the abil-
ity to travel with laptops, other aspects of the information technology 
revolution, including telephone cards with relatively inexpensive rates 
for calling internationally, are widely accessible all over the world. In-
ternet cafes enable even those without regular telephone, electricity, or 
Internet service to have access to VoIP. In short, it is much easier for 
migrants to keep up with their families back home and for the families 
back home to keep up with the absent household member. 
Remittances, the earnings that immigrant workers send back home 
in cash and in kind, are an important by-product of migration. The 
research community has only recently come to recognize the perva-
siveness and growing magnitude of these international money flows. 
While the measurable growth in money transfers from emigrants to the 
families back home is likely due to a variety of factors, including better 
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measurement techniques and an increase in the percentage of families 
with migrants, I strongly suspect that the ease with which migrants are 
now able to maintain contact with family back home is an important 
contributing factor to the observed growth and increased persistence of 
these flows. In effect, distance is not as great an obstacle for keeping 
in touch as it used to be. Those with jobs and earning power in their 
adopted homelands are better informed of the needs and desires of fam-
ily back home. Remittances are less likely to taper off and are more 
likely to persist for a longer duration. 
This book collects the papers from a yearlong lecture series held at 
Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan, on the topic of 
international migration, with an emphasis on remittances.1 An overrid-
ing theme that emerges from this collection is the need to appreciate the 
connection between international migration and remittances in order to 
fully understand either migration or remittances. Understanding what 
lies behind migration will often provide us with insights on remittances. 
But equally important is the need to fully understand the impacts of re-
mittances, as this will provide us with insights about migration. 
Some individuals migrate to better their economic standing, others 
to diversify the income streams of the family, and still others to reunite 
with family in the destination country. Families sometimes flee their 
home communities and countries on account of religious or political 
persecution. Some migrants leave home with the intention of perma-
nently resettling in the foreign destination, while others migrate on a 
temporary basis—to study, to help a relative in need, to accumulate 
funds toward purchasing a large-ticket item. Regardless of the reasons 
for migrants leaving home, substantial inflows of remittances are com-
mon to many regions of the world experiencing emigration. While mi-
gration and some of its more obvious effects on the out-migration areas 
have been extensively studied, many aspects of these migratory flows 
are still poorly understood, including the return flow of money home. 
But as the contributors to this book point out, to get the full picture we 
need to understand the impact of remittances on the home communities 
and on migration in turn. A variety of reasons may explain the absence 
of research efforts in the area of international remittances, including 
misinformation about the true volume of flows and overly simplistic 
models of the motives of migrants who send money home. This book 
is intended to fill this void by offering the views of six migration schol-
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ars who came to the WMU campus to share their research in this area 
and to offer suggestions for additional efforts toward understanding this 
complex process. 
The collection begins in Chapter 2 with a general overview of in-
ternational migration by Robert E.B. Lucas, who notes that almost 10 
percent of the population in richer countries is foreign-born, and that 
the majority of these foreigners originated in the developing and low-
income world. Poor economic conditions at home are usually presumed 
to be the impetus for emigration, and a good deal of attention has been 
paid to that motive for migration. While understanding the connections 
between poverty and migration can further our understanding of popu-
lation movements and their effect on the receiving country, Lucas notes 
that it is equally important to understand the economic impacts of mi-
gration for those areas experiencing out-migration. 
Lucas suggests that while economic conditions may explain migra-
tion, migration in turn explains economic development back home. Dis-
entangling the two can present a challenge for researchers. Nonetheless, 
Lucas discusses how emigration affects the well-being and economic be-
havior of those left behind. Emigration does so in several ways: through 
the remittances that are sent home, through changes in the labor supply 
of the remaining household members because of departing members, 
through exchange rate impacts, and through their effects on the human 
capital levels of the remaining population. Lucas makes clear that in 
some of these areas the research community is relatively well versed on 
those impacts, but that in other areas a consensus still has not emerged 
and we have much to learn concerning the results of out-migration. 
Lucas’s chapter brings to the forefront a fundamental point: wheth-
er governments acknowledge this or not, the immigration policies of 
the in-migration areas can and do significantly affect economic devel-
opment in the low-income areas of the world. Debates on migration 
policy rarely consider the point that differing domestic policies on im-
migration will have differing consequences for migrant-sending areas 
of the world. Although there is little consideration given to this aspect 
of migration policy, economists should, at a minimum, provide poli-
cymakers with the facts and data that will present options for devising 
policies and programs that can lift low-income countries of the world. 
A better understanding of the consequences of migration policy should 
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increase the odds that policy can be tailored to better benefit out-migra-
tion areas. 
In this regard it is important that economists recognize the impacts 
of differing immigration policies and that they be in a position to in-
form policymakers of those results when policymakers craft immigra-
tion policies. In the book’s third chapter, Oded Stark and C. Simon Fan 
provide additional backing for the notion that immigration policies in 
high-income areas might have unintended consequences for the out-
migration areas. 
Stark and Fan note that while it has long been recognized that unem-
ployment in developing countries drives individuals to emigrate so they 
can join the labor force in the developed world, the notion that causality 
may also run in the other direction has not been adequately considered. 
As Stark and others have argued, the prospect of high earnings in the 
foreign destination may induce greater investments in human capital. 
In other words, rewards to education in the developed world may drive 
potential emigrants to spend more time in school and to acquire more 
skills, leading to “brain gain” in the developing economy. But what has 
not been adequately recognized is that those out-migration probabilities 
raise reservation wages (wage expectations) for those seeking to emi-
grate even while they wait for the opportunity to do so. Given that im-
migration restrictions in the developed world exist, an excess demand 
for visas results. Not everyone who wants to migrate gets to migrate, 
and, given the disparities in wage expectations and wage offers, “edu-
cated unemployment” persists.
Stark and Fan’s model zeroes in on this educated unemployment 
phenomenon as an important channel by which the immigration policies 
of high-income countries affect economic conditions in lower-income 
areas of the world. Immigration policies that select more-educated im-
migrants can encourage unemployment in migrant-sending regions of 
the world, since such policies raise the supply of the better educated in 
areas with few opportunities for those skills. The authors lament that, to 
date, rigorous empirical analysis of the complicated interplay between 
migrant-sending and -receiving areas has been limited. It is important 
that we attempt to follow up on these relationships to better devise poli-
cies and to better understand the connection between brain drain and 
brain gain.
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While the Lucas and the Stark and Fan chapters focus strictly on 
the impacts of migration and policy on the low-income world, in the 
book’s fourth chapter Christopher Woodruff looks at the effects on both 
nations of traffic crossing back and forth over the border between the 
United States and Mexico, which he describes as the “largest unilateral 
flow of people (in one direction) and resources (in the other) in the 
world.” Woodruff notes that 10 percent of the Mexican-born popula-
tion resides in the United States—indisputably a massive movement of 
people across a national boundary. Equally important, and occurring in 
conjunction with this population movement, are the flows of monetary 
resources sent by Mexican immigrants in the United States back to their 
home communities and families. 
Woodruff uses these significant bilateral flows to drive home an 
important point concerning the analysis of migration’s impacts on out-
migration regions: while it may be tempting to analyze the impacts of 
migration simply by comparing the outcomes in households with a mi-
grant to those in households without a migrant, such a comparison is 
unlikely to provide us with reliable information on the effects of migra-
tion. This is because households that have experienced the migration 
of a family member are likely to differ fundamentally from households 
that have not experienced the migration of a family member. If we sim-
ply compare the two types of households, it will be unclear whether 
the differences observed are due to migration or to the underlying, un-
observed, unmeasured characteristics that distinguish the two sets of 
households in the first place. 
In reviewing the measurement issues, Woodruff considers three pos-
sible impacts of Mexican migration to the United States: 1) migration’s 
impact on business investments in Mexico, 2) its impact on the health 
status of children, and 3) its impact on educational attainment. 
He points out the pitfalls of using an empirical analysis that ig-
nores the fact that migrant (and remittance-receiving) households are 
not randomly selected from the overall population. Instead, he directs 
us to appropriate strategies and techniques to compensate for the non-
randomness so that we can properly measure the impacts of migration 
and remittances. 
Using studies that employ appropriate measurement techniques, 
Woodruff concludes that while migration does not seem to induce new 
business formation, migration is responsible for substantial investments 
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in microenterprises in Mexico. As for its effect on human capital, migra-
tion seems to promote educational investments in young children while 
decreasing these same investments in older children. Although child 
mortality rates are lower in families that have a migrant, researchers 
are discovering that migration has a negative effect on specific health 
investments that promote healthy outcomes. For example, doctor’s 
visits and innoculations may be postponed because of monetary and 
other strains arising from the migration of a family member. Woodruff 
emphasizes the pains researchers must take to properly measure the 
separate impacts of migration and of remittances. He provides us with a 
number of methodologies that can be used to overcome these complex 
measurement problems. 
The fifth chapter in this book concentrates on remittances from the 
United States to Latin America. Taking advantage of the wealth of in-
formation contained in the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) 
survey, along with the more established Mexico-based survey, the Mex-
ican Migration Project (MMP93), Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes provides 
us with a broad, comparative picture of the remittances that flow from 
the United States to six Latin American countries—Costa Rica, the Do-
minican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, and Mexico. In order to help 
the reader better understand these money flows, she discusses what the 
surveys reveal regarding who migrates and under what conditions they 
migrate to the United States. The surveys rely on information provided 
by return migrants. While there are significant differences by country in 
the proportion of return migrants who declare to have remitted during 
their last U.S. visit, she finds that on average 70 percent of the migrants 
claim to have remitted home during their last U.S. visit. They remitted 
an average of $300 a month, which was equivalent to 40 percent of their 
average monthly earnings. 
The MMP93 and the LAMP also collect information on immigra-
tion status and on the use of smuggling services to undertake illegal im-
migration. Such information provides us with insights into the barriers 
that confront migrants as well as information on how these barriers are 
negotiated. This in turn hints at the likelihood of large monetary obliga-
tions incurred back home, which are likely to be reflected in the size of 
the remittances sent home: if would-be migrants need to contract for 
smuggling services, it is likely that they will have to remit large sums 
of money home to pay off those debts and obligations. 
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Of particular interest in the chapter by Amuedo-Dorantes is the 
cross-country comparison of the end uses of remittances. Considerable 
controversy exists regarding the types of expenditures that are under-
taken with remittances. Are remittances used by the family remaining 
at home to finance consumption, or are they used to save and invest? 
The comparative nature of the surveys sheds light on this hotly debated 
issue. 
In the sixth chapter, David J. McKenzie takes us to another region 
of the world, the South Pacific, where he examines another large mi-
gratory flow: the flow of Tongans to New Zealand, along with the re-
turn flow of New Zealand dollars to Tonga. One-third of Tongans have 
emigrated, and remittances account for 39 percent of Tonga’s gross do-
mestic product (GDP). The sheer magnitude of these flows makes the 
Tonga/New Zealand case one of interest. 
McKenzie uses information from the Pacific Island–New Zealand 
Migration Survey (PINZMS), which queries respondents in detail on 
the channels used to remit. He supplements this with information he has 
collected concerning the costs of sending remittances from a number of 
high-immigration countries around the world to small island states. This 
permits him a unique perspective on the relative costs and constraints 
faced by Tongans remitting money home. In a nutshell, McKenzie finds 
that the relative costs for remitting in the case of Tongans residing in 
New Zealand are extremely high, and he offers suggestions for policy 
that may lead to a reduction in the costs of remitting and thereby in-
crease the volume remitted. 
McKenzie comes to several conclusions regarding the longer-term 
flow of remittances. He analyzes the relative expectations by remit-
ters and remittees on the future flow of remittances. This information 
is crucial to the debate about the long-run impacts of migratory flows 
on out-migration areas. Some researchers have expressed concern that 
families in out-migration areas learn to depend on the regular monetary 
inflows from their family members abroad, letting their own human and 
physical capital depreciate. Such a concern would be especially critical 
if indeed recipients of remittances expected the monetary inflows to 
persist indefinitely. However, because of the nature of the survey, which 
matches recipients to senders, McKenzie is able to ascertain expecta-
tions regarding the future flows of remittances from the perspective of 
both agents. In the long run, both remitters and remittees expect remit-
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tances to decay with time. If remitters do get hooked on remittances, it 
is not because they falsely believe that the flows will persist indefinite-
ly. The family at home seems to have reasonably realistic expectations 
about how long the flow of money from family members abroad will 
continue and to realize that over time the flow will diminish. 
The book closes with a thought-provoking chapter by Leah K. 
VanWey that includes a typology of migration-remittance systems. The 
typology helps us categorize the three types of migration-remittances 
systems that are most common: 1) male household heads migrating in 
order to remit home with the purpose of supporting a wife and children, 
2) children who migrate and send money back home to help parents, 
and 3) hometown associations of migrants that collectively remit to 
benefit the hometown community. Understanding these variations in 
migration-remittance systems enables us to identify the likely impacts 
of remittances in the home community, since they help distinguish re-
mittances that are channeled into private consumption versus those that 
are channeled into investment and the public good. 
Van Wey emphasizes that to truly understand the consequences that 
remittances have for migrant-sending communities, it is necessary to 
consider in greater detail the institutions that are in place in the home 
community, as these ultimately have an impact on remittances. Home 
community institutions can exert significant pressures on migrants to 
make financial contributions. Understanding the strengths and the pull 
of these institutions may give us a more thorough appreciation of the 
impacts of migration on economic development. 
The chapters in this book all point to the multidimensional ties 
that exist between migrants in their adopted homes and the commu-
nities from which they originate. Wage disparities, often summarized 
as “push” and “pull” factors, certainly help explain migration, but the 
process is really much more complicated than that. The monetary flows 
that persist beyond the initial migration have significant and lasting im-
pacts on migrant-sending regions of the world. These are important to 
account for if we are to truly understand migration and its long-run 
effects. 
As the world’s information and transportation infrastructure contin-
ues to grow, it is likely that emigrants will maintain even closer contacts 
with their home communities. The links between migrant-sending and 
migrant-receiving areas will likely get stronger. For this reason, now 
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is an opportune time to help craft policies that will mold the contribu-
tion that immigrants can make both to their adopted and to their home 
communities. 
Note
 1. The series was the forty-second annual Werner Sichel Lecture-Seminar Series, 
hosted by the WMU Department of Economics and jointly sponsored by the 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and Western Michigan Univer-
sity during the academic year 2005–2006.
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and Economic Development 
in Low-Income Countries 
Lessons from Recent Data
Robert E.B. Lucas
Boston	University
The links between international migration and economic develop-
ment of the low-income countries have recently come to attract a good 
deal of attention: in 2005 the Global Commission on International Mi-
gration (2005) came out with its report, much of which focused on de-
velopment implications for the low-income countries; the World Bank’s 
Global	Economic	Prospects	2006 was subtitled “Economic Implications 
of Remittances and Migration” (World Bank 2005); and in September 
2006 the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Develop-
ment took place at the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN).
Why is the migration-development nexus attracting so much atten-
tion now? Two key factors go a long way toward explaining the in-
creased interest. First, international migration continues to grow. Ac-
cording to UN estimates, the stock of persons living in a country in 
which they were not born expanded by 14 percent from 1990 to 2000. 
The breakup of the former Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia accounted 
for some of this absolute increase, as internal migrants were suddenly 
now counted as international migrants. Most of the rest of the growth 
in migration simply reflects world population growth. In fact, migrants 
in 2000 remained close to their 1970 portion of world population, at 
about 3 percent. But what has really attracted attention is the absolute 
expansion in levels of migration to the higher-income countries. By 
2000, almost 1 person in 10 in the developed regions was an interna-
tional migrant. The foreign-born population of the United States grew 
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by about 13 million during the 1990s, and the number of immigrant 
visas issued by the United States in that decade was similar to the num-
ber issued during the mass migrations from Europe in the first decades 
of the twentieth century. Indeed, immigration to both the United States 
and Canada has been on a long-term upward trend since the 1930s. But 
the national origins of those migrants are now quite different from those 
of earlier migrations to North America; European migrants have given 
way to new waves of Asian immigrants, and in the United States, Latin 
American migrants have also increased in importance. Meanwhile, Eu-
rope faced a flood of asylum seekers arriving during the 1990s. Some 
were fleeing from violence on Europe’s edges, such as in the former Yu-
goslavia, but others came from much farther afield. Recognition rates 
of these asylum seekers were low to begin with and fell as more came. 
Yet the mass influx, coupled with the fact that the migrants’ countries of 
origin had not been common sources of earlier migrants, provoked con-
siderable attention among the European Union (EU) countries, which 
had never seen themselves as countries of immigration. Indeed, the EU 
member states still do not possess any coherent or mutually consistent 
immigration policies.
Besides the increasing numbers of international migrants, the sec-
ond component that has attracted so much attention among researchers 
is the flow of remittances that is now being reported. The World Bank’s 
Global	Economic	Prospects	2006 reports that by 2004 remittances to 
the developing regions had grown to nearly US$160 billion (World 
Bank 2005). This was about 50 percent greater than all Official Devel-
opment Assistance.
The link between, on the one hand, this growing interest among re-
searchers, international agencies, and governments in international mi-
gration and, on the other, economic development in the lower-income 
countries of origin runs both ways: development at home shapes out-
ward migration, while the process of migration simultaneously affects 
development in a number of ways. The next section of this chapter turns 
first to the former link: the effects of development on outward migra-
tion. Most of the rest of the chapter then addresses various aspects of 
the latter link: the effect of migration upon development at home.
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THE CAUSES oF MIgRATIoN, AND THE EFFECTS oF 
DEvELoPMENT UPoN MIgRATIoN PRESSURES
Migration outcomes (i.e., whether individuals are able to migrate) 
are a combination of the desire to emigrate and of constraints upon re-
alizing those desires. Various forms of entry controls in the destination 
countries represent one obvious form of constraint. Yet these controls 
are far from being the only determinant of migration outcomes. The 
desire to migrate from a particular country shapes the application rate 
for legal entry. Moreover, no country has controls that are absolutely 
effective. Despite the militarization of the U.S. borders, the former Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that the number 
of irregular migrants in the United States doubled between 1990 and 
2000.1 Estimates of the number of irregular migrants in the EU range as 
high as 10 million. Similarly, even such countries as Saudi Arabia and 
Japan, which have much tighter controls, have significant numbers of 
foreigners who have overstayed their visas.
Virtually all of the assembled evidence indicates that the gap in 
earnings opportunities for migrants between their home country and 
their overseas destination is a significant and important factor in driv-
ing migration flows. Thus, economic development at home—provided 
that job creation and a tighter labor market accompany this economic 
expansion—serves to diminish emigration pressures.
A counterargument has become widely accepted and is featured in 
a number of major reports on international migration, namely the con-
cept of a migration hump. The idea is that at low income levels a rise 
in incomes serves to exacerbate emigration pressures, while at higher 
incomes a drop in income exacerbates emigration pressures. At least 
five hypotheses have been put forward as underlying the lower arm of a 
migration hump. They are enumerated as follows: 
 1)  Rising incomes result in more rapid population growth, and the 
resultant population pressures are the root cause of additional 
emigration. Using this hypothesis, Hatton and Williamson 
(2002) posit that it was lagged population growth from about 
two decades earlier that drove the mass emigrations from Eu-
rope in the last century rather than rising incomes per se. On 
the other hand, very few countries are now in a phase in which 
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population growth is still increasing with development, so this 
hypothesis is of less relevance today. 
 2)  Trade liberalization, undertaken in an attempt to accelerate de-
velopment, can result in temporary job loss, and some of those 
displaced may emigrate. 
 3) A similar claim has been made with respect to the broader 
structural transformations (especially the shift from agriculture 
to industry) that generally accompany economic expansion. 
Note, however, that both of these latter arguments maintain 
that it is labor market slack that drives emigration pressures, 
which is consistent with the view that gaps in earning opportu-
nities are a major causal factor in migration. 
 4)  Rising incomes at home may ease credit constraints that previ-
ously prevented would-be migrants from financing costly mi-
gration abroad. 
 5)  It has been suggested that the returns on remittances are higher 
in middle-income countries, making emigration and remit-
tance to these states financially more attractive. 
Although these hypotheses are all eminently reasonable, and al-
though the notion of a migration hump is now fairly universally ac-
cepted, there appears to be little or no systematic evidence to support 
this pattern; rather, evidence supports the contrary, that at lower income 
levels a rise in incomes serves to relieve emigration pressures, while at 
higher incomes a drop in income relieves emigration pressures.
This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which shows net annual migration 
per thousand of population from 1995 to 2000 for 164 countries. (Nega-
tive outcomes reflect net out-migration.) The horizontal axis displays 
the natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, mea-
sured in purchasing power parity U.S. dollar prices. The two superim-
posed lines are a simple linear regression line and a spline regression. 
The simple linear regression line indicates a significant positive asso-
ciation: lower-income countries tend to have higher rates of net emigra-
tion, and higher-income countries exhibit more net immigration. More 
importantly, the spline variant clearly shows that the lowest-income 
countries do not have very low rates of net out-migration, contrary to 
what a migration hump would suggest.
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Although most existing studies support the notion that emigration 
diminishes as income levels and earning opportunities at home improve, 
there is considerable noise around this association, as is clear in Figure 
2.1. Development is by no means the only factor affecting migration 
outcomes: geography is important, too. This is brought out in Figure 
2.2, which shows the percentages of each of the non-OECD countries’ 
populations present in the OECD member states as of 2000.2 First, it is 
apparent that there is a great deal of movement among the OECD mem-
ber countries themselves, very often to neighboring members. Beyond 
that, the high emigrations from the Caribbean and Central America 
to the United States are evident, as are the large migrations from the 
Maghreb, Eastern Europe, and parts of the Middle East to the EU. The 
countries with high migrations to the OECD nations from further away 
tend to be countries that have spawned large numbers of refugees, such 
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Figure 2.2  Non-oECD Country Populations Present in oECD Member States, 2000 (%)
SOURCE: Docquier and Marfouk (2005).
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as Somalia, Angola, and parts of Indochina, though there are exceptions 
(such as the Philippines).
In fact, geography seems to be even more important than income 
levels and earning opportunities in shaping the migration of low-skilled 
workers. Figure 2.3 is similar to Figure 2.2 but shows only the percent-
ages from each country of the adult populations in the OECD with nine 
years of education or less. Two aspects of the data in Figure 2.3 are of 
particular note. First, some of the OECD member countries are them-
selves major sources of low-skilled migrants in the OECD. Not surpris-
ingly, large numbers of low-skilled workers are present from Mexico 
and Turkey, both of which are OECD members. But other countries, 
such as those of southern Europe, are also key sources of low-skilled 
workers within the OECD. In fact, 32 percent of the low-skilled mi-
grants in OECD countries are from OECD members other than Mexi-
co and Turkey. The second aspect to note is that very few low-skilled 
workers gain access to OECD countries from countries that are distant 
from the OECD regions.
Yet this does not mean that countries whose populations are largely 
unskilled do not have significant out-migration. Indeed, as the map in 
Figure 2.4 shows, a number of countries in low-income regions ex-
hibit fairly high rates of net out-migration even though their stock of 
migrants in the OECD is not particularly large. This is a reflection of 
the importance of south-south migrations, which often form the domi-
nant option for low-skilled workers from the low-income countries. For 
instance, Figure 2.4 shows quite high rates of net emigration from In-
donesia, Burkina Faso, and Kazakhstan, though emigration rates from 
these countries to the OECD regions are relatively low. Meanwhile, 
some of the better-off countries within the developing regions, such as 
Malaysia and Gabon, underwent significant net immigration.
A major example of south-south movement has been the mass mi-
grations to the Persian Gulf from South and Southeast Asia as well as 
from some of the lower-income countries in the Middle East. Many ob-
servers thought this process was coming to an end with the decline in oil 
prices in the early 1980s, but in fact there was a resurgence during the 
1990s, involving a wider spectrum of source countries. But other, less 
well-known movements are important too: from Indonesia to Malaysia; 
from large parts of sub-Saharan Africa to South Africa, to Gabon, and to 
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Figure 2.3  Non-oECD Country Adult Populations Present in oECD Member States with Nine Years of Education 
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other higher-income countries within the region; from Burma to Thai-
land; from Bangladesh to India; and many more. 
Economic development, geography, the incidence of violence, and 
many other factors help to shape these complex patterns of migration. 
But what are the effects of the migrations upon economic development 
at the migrants’ place of origin? What underlies the other half of the 
migration-development link?
THE EFFECTS oF MIgRATIoN UPoN  
ECoNoMIC DEvELoPMENT
Simulations suggest that there are huge global income gains to be 
had even from a small expansion in international migration (Walmsley 
and Winters 2003; World Bank 2005). The key to these large gains is the 
increases in earnings available to migrants upon moving. Accordingly, 
the migrants themselves are the big winners. In practice, part of the 
gains to migrants are siphoned off by various middlemen. In particular, 
both legal and irregular migrations have become increasingly commer-
cialized, so that recruiters and smugglers now command a significant 
fraction of the rents to be had from migration. Indeed, the limited avail-
able evidence suggests that the lower the income of the migrant’s coun-
try of origin, the higher this rent extraction becomes (Lucas 2005, pp. 
275–288). Because the migrants have almost nothing to begin with, the 
large gains to be realized in these lower-income contexts give greater 
leverage to the middlemen.
It should be emphasized that the net gains to the migrants them-
selves are a form of economic development for the nationals of the 
country of origin, even if these income gains are not drawn from do-
mestic production. The effect of migration upon the incomes of those 
left at home is an important one, but the answer to the question of what 
kind of an effect it has is generally ambiguous. Although such elements 
as tighter labor markets at home and the gains resulting from remit-
tances sent by departed migrants may relieve the economic situation 
at home, the potential for effects such as brain drain to act in the op-
posite direction is very real. One should not expect a uniform answer to 
whether emigration helps or hurts those left behind.
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Remittances
Transfers of remittances from migrants may be divided into two 
types: those that pass through formal sector intermediaries, versus those 
that are transmitted through myriad money dealers in the informal bank-
ing network. The latter generally prove cheaper and faster. The official 
data on remittances, as reported by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), refer largely to formal remittances, though even these data are 
subject to substantial measurement error. Little systematic information 
exists on informal transfers, though for some low-income countries in-
formal receipts appear to be relatively large.
The effect of remittances upon people left at home has been the 
subject of considerable controversy and some confusion. Other things 
being equal, receipt of such transfers must raise the standard of living. 
But whether the combined effect of departure of the migrants and re-
ceipt of their remittances raises standards of living for those remaining 
at home is far less clear. Moreover, whether remittances are spent in 
such a way as to accelerate the rate of growth of home-country produc-
tion is also unclear. Indeed, it is common for researchers to complain 
that too little investment occurs out of remittances and even for officials 
to direct policy to encourage such investments. Such efforts are largely 
misdirected. Officials of the home country may well feel that too little 
is being invested in their nation’s economy, yet why the recipients of 
remittances should be singled out to undertake the additional invest-
ments remains unjustified. Remittances are a private form of income 
and should be subject to the same rights and privileges as other forms 
of private income. To be sure, artificial barriers to private investments 
should be dismantled, but this is true no matter whether these invest-
ments are financed out of remittances or otherwise.
The extent to which remittances serve to alleviate poverty in the 
home area depends upon the propensity of poor people to migrate, and, 
once they have migrated, upon their propensity to remit. In addition, the 
indirect effects on poverty alleviation are influenced by the multiplier 
effects of remittance spending and by any job creation that occurs as a 
result of additional investment coming from the inflow of remittances. 
Researchers have devoted most of their attention to remittances’ direct 
effect on alleviating poverty. The extent to which current remittances 
alleviate poverty through this direct effect seems to be sensitive to how 
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one defines the poverty level of families—whether by asset possession 
or current earnings—and to whether earnings are defined at the level 
they were at before or after the migrant left. Nonetheless there appears 
to be relatively uniform agreement that remittance inflows indeed do 
alleviate poverty, and in some instances this effect is estimated to be 
large.3 The poor do migrate, even internationally, though perhaps more 
so internally. The poor also do remit. However, in a number of regions 
the very poorest are left out of this cycle of international migration and 
remittance receipt.
There is also growing evidence that remittances serve as a key ele-
ment to ensure smoother consumption patterns for families in low-in-
come countries. Given the vagaries of farming, many families in devel-
oping regions see their incomes fluctuate substantially between good 
and bad years. Add to this such risks as the family’s main wage-earner 
getting ill or a natural disaster occurring, and prospects can be quite 
uncertain. A plausible response to these threats is to have some family 
members migrate to places where they will be unlikely to meet with the 
same misfortune. Then, if disaster does strike back home, the migrant 
can support those family members in trouble by remitting. Research has 
brought to light several examples of situations where helping to stem a 
crisis appears to be reflected in observed remittance patterns.4
Azam and Gubert (2002) note that one can generally expect moral 
hazard responses to the insurance provided by remittances. Specifically, 
families that receive remittances may well react by reducing their labor 
effort at home. This argument is supported by findings in the Kayes area 
in western Mali, where household survey data indicate that although 
families of migrants have greater agricultural assets, their crop produc-
tion is actually lower than that of nonmigrant families. Moreover, Azam 
and Gubert’s results illustrate that this pattern is not simply a result 
of a smaller number of family workers available at home following 
the departure of migrants, nor a reflection of families with lower pro-
ductivity tending to have members that migrate more. Certainly these 
findings are consistent with a growing body of literature demonstrating 
that, upon receipt of remittances, families enjoy part of the rise in living 
standards in the form of additional leisure.5
A second impact of remittances upon the labor market at home may 
also be noted. To the extent that remittances provide a sufficient amount 
of foreign exchange to support the exchange rate, they also make ex-
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porting more difficult. This effect, which is sometimes referred to as the 
“Dutch disease” effect of remittances, can serve to limit employment 
creation in the export sector, potentially leading to greater pressures to 
emigrate.6
Labor Market Impacts at Home
Apart from the effects of remittances through moral hazard in labor 
supply and through the exchange rate upon employment creation, the 
departure of migrant workers can readily affect the labor markets at 
home more directly. The withdrawal of migrants typically will either 
put pressure on home country wages to rise or will at least shorten the 
queue for jobs, depending upon whether or not the market has a labor 
surplus. More generally, migration’s overall impact on the home coun-
try’s labor market will also depend upon the extent of internal migration 
induced to replace departing workers and upon the skill mix of those 
migrating. A key element is whether the skills possessed by emigrants 
are complements or substitutes for the skills of those who remain at 
home. For example, the departure of highly skilled workers could raise 
the earnings of their direct competitors at home yet lower the demand 
for less-skilled workers who would have worked alongside those de-
parting migrants in ancillary positions (Davies and Wooton 1992).
Rather surprisingly, although the issue of immigration’s impacts on 
the labor market has been the subject of extensive research, the issue 
of emigration’s impacts upon labor markets in countries of origin re-
mains largely neglected. Certainly no generalizations appear possible 
at this juncture.7 Nonetheless, how the home country’s labor market 
performs for highly skilled persons proves central to determining how 
much damage is done by the brain drain.
Brain Drain, Brain gain, and Brain overhang
Figure 2.5 shows the percentage of each country’s tertiary educated 
population residing abroad in an OECD country in 2000.8 Although this 
percentage omits emigration of the highly skilled to non-OECD coun-
tries, on which no systematic data exist, Figure 2.5 nonetheless offers 
a good picture of the incidence of the brain drain flowing from devel-
oping to industrialized regions. Particularly high rates of brain drain 
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are observed from Central America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, 
parts of the Middle East and Indochina, and across almost the whole of 
Africa.
North America, and the United States in particular, is the princi-
pal destination for these highly skilled migrants. European firms have 
only recently joined the race to attract the highly skilled, and Europe’s 
foreign population is dominated by lower-skilled workers. Even the 
exodus of highly skilled professionals from Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (consisting of 11 former Soviet 
republics) occurred mostly to the United States during the 1990s, not to 
neighboring Western Europe.
Do the low-income countries lose from this departure of their most 
talented and highly educated? Chief among the potential sources of 
harm commonly cited are the following three types of loss: 1) the loss 
of economic growth, since such growth generally correlates with the 
presence of educated persons; 2) the loss of external benefits (such as 
better governance) that come with the presence of highly skilled com-
patriots; and 3) the loss of public funds invested in the highly skilled, 
as well as the loss of funds that would be taxed from their incomes at 
home. Each of these losses is controversial. Although the presence of 
highly skilled people is correlated with faster growth and with vari-
ous beneficial outcomes such as the aforementioned better governance, 
whether this presence is the causal factor remains in dispute. Moreover, 
if there are any benefits, the question of whether the highly educated 
themselves reap the lion’s share of these benefits in the form of higher 
incomes remains untested. And whether the highly educated make a 
net contribution to the fiscal balance is also contentious, since public 
spending on the highly educated and their families is often greater. On 
the other hand, the loss of public funds invested in the highly educated 
is much clearer in countries that heavily subsidize higher education of 
even the children of elite families.
A separate but closely related aspect of these potential losses is 
countries’ inability to deliver key social services, such as health care 
and education, without trained personnel. The mass recruiting of health 
care workers from Africa has attracted particular criticism in the face 
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic there, not to mention malaria and other dis-
eases that ravage the continent. Yet it is not clear that the emigration 
of doctors and nurses from Africa is the main constraint on the ability 
Pozo Book.indb   25 4/18/2007   10:03:10 AM
26   Lucas
of African states to offer better health care (Clemens 2006). Indeed, 
across the spectrum of professions and in all developing regions, the 
inefficient use and allocation of the highly skilled classes raise serious 
doubts about the real costs imposed by their departure—a feature that 
might be called “brain overhang.”
But many observers go even further, claiming that emigration of 
the highly skilled can confer benefits on their country of origin through 
the activities of a professional diaspora, which has become known as 
“brain gain.” The best documented of these arguments is that a diaspora 
may have a beneficial effect on promoting trade with the home country; 
it does this by its members improving the flow of information between 
the home and the destination countries and by their ability to enforce 
contracts (Rauch 2001). For example, it seems the presence of Indian IT 
professionals in this country was critical to expanding India’s software 
exports to the United States (Saxenian 2004). Other routes that can lead 
to beneficial effects and are commonly cited, but far less well docu-
mented, involve the transfer of technology and the promotion of direct 
investments in the home country.
However, the aspect of brain gain that has perhaps attracted the most 
attention recently is the inducement to expand education at home. The 
idea is that the emigration opportunity afforded by higher education 
induces greater college enrollments, and that only a fraction of those 
thus attracted to continue their education will actually manage to leave 
the country. If the stock of the highly educated population left at home 
thus expands, domestic production may then be improved (Mountford 
1997; Stark and Wang 2002). Some observers may express reservations 
about this: the expansion of home education is hardly costless, and the 
freshly attracted students may be less competent, for instance (Schiff 
2005). But perhaps more importantly, the evidence across countries 
does not seem to support this hypothesis, though certainly in some spe-
cific countries (such as the Philippines) enrollment in higher education 
indeed appears to be quite sensitive to overseas opportunities (Lucas 
2005, Box 4.1).
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SUMMINg UP: PoLICIES AND PRoSPECTS
The effects of emigration upon economic development for those 
remaining at home are mixed. The effects are typically more poverty-
alleviating, and possibly more positive for development in general, in 
cases where migrants are drawn from the lower-skilled parts of the la-
bor force. It also tends to be true that the effects upon incomes of those 
remaining at home are more positive when the return rate (or at least 
the intended return rate) of migrants is higher. For instance, the massive 
remittances resulting from migration to the Persian Gulf are largely a 
reflection of the enforced family separation and the temporary nature of 
these movements.
Virtually none of the high-income countries really think of their 
migration policies as part of a more coherent development policy for 
the lower-income regions. Indeed, the competition among firms in the 
high-income countries to attract the best and the brightest from the de-
veloping regions is heating up: an ever-increasing number of industrial-
ized countries are actively recruiting foreign students, often with the 
express intent of keeping the most successful. Meanwhile, almost all of 
the high-income countries have in place massive agricultural subsidies 
and protect low-skilled manufacturing activities. Both agriculture and 
manufacturing employ irregular migrants from the developing regions. 
However, the low-skilled workers thus brought to the OECD coun-
tries tend to come from nearby nations that are not among the lowest-in-
come countries. In fact, the force of geography is such that the propen-
sity of countries to send their low-skilled workers to the OECD regions 
rises significantly with the income level of the originating country.
Temporary migrations of low-skilled workers probably have the 
biggest impact on poverty reduction in the developing regions of any 
type of migration. Most high-income countries seem to prefer tempo-
rary migrants to permanent ones and have expanded several of their 
temporary migration schemes. Yet such schemes face a fundamental 
dilemma: attempts to integrate migrants, to promote their rights, and 
to enable family reunification all tend to discourage return migration. 
On the other hand, the family and social costs can be high from gov-
ernment approaches to temporary migration that prevent legal family 
accompaniment.
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What we probably need to seek are better ways of managing such 
temporary migrations. Certainly a number of steps seem eminently fea-
sible to encourage greater return rates. Extending Mode 4 of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to encompass low-skilled ser-
vices may be one such critical step.9 Establishing transferability of pen-
sion schemes to the home country is another. The use of intermediary 
contracting of projects appears to be particularly effective in ensuring 
that migrants return home, though such schemes need closer regulation 
to prevent abuse of the contract workers.10 Ironically, irregular migrants 
are discouraged from returning home when the prospect of recrossing 
the border becomes more formidable.
In practice, only a few developing countries actually have very high 
emigration rates to the industrialized nations. Distance deters migration, 
both internally and internationally (Lucas 2001). Social networks help 
to amplify migration streams, once initiated. The combined effect is 
that remote countries, and remote villages within countries, are left out 
of the migration process. Where migration is never initiated, the com-
munity becomes increasingly isolated from a growing migration flow, 
both internally and globally, and pockets of poverty remain there. Yet 
south-south migrations often present migration opportunities of shorter 
distance, and consequently in today’s setting they may represent the 
most important vehicles of poverty relief through migration from the 
lowest-income countries.
This picture could change. Communications, transportation, and 
commercialization of movement are all increasing. Moreover, the demo-
graphic map will shift dramatically over the coming decades. Most mi-
grants are young adults, typically ages 15–30. By far the fastest growing 
populations in this age range are in sub-Saharan Africa (Lucas 2006). 
The world may well witness a rapid Africanization of international mi-
gration in the next half century—not just within the African continent, 
which is the dominant pattern at present, but out of Africa too.
Notes
 1. On March 1, 2003, the INS was relocated from the Department of Justice to the 
Department of Homeland Security and split into three agencies: the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Bureau of Customs and Border Pro-
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tection, and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “Irregular” 
migrants are undocumented or illegal migrants.
 2. The OECD, or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, is com-
posed of 30 market democracies and is dedicated to helping governments tackle 
the economic, social, and governance challenges of a globalized economy.
 3. See, for example, Tingsabadh (1989) on Thailand, Gustafsson and Makonnen 
(1993) on migration of Lesotho’s mine workers to South Africa, Lachaud (1999) 
on Burkina Faso, Adams and Page (2003a) on North Africa, and Adams (2005) 
on Guatemala, plus Adams and Page (2003b) for more global evidence.
 4. See Lucas and Stark (1985) on Botswana, Hoddinott (1992, 1994) on western 
Kenya, Brown (1997) on Pacific Island migrants, Schrieder and Knerr (2000) on 
Cameroon, Gubert (2002) on the Kayes areas of western Mali, and Quartey and 
Blankson (2004) on Ghana.
 5.  See Funkhouser (1992) on Nicaragua, Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) and Yang 
(2004) on the Philippines, and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) on Mexico.
 6. For an early discussion of this point, see Quibria (1997). The	Economist coined 
the term “Dutch disease” in 1977 to describe the manufacturing sector’s de-
cline in the Netherlands after natural gas was discovered in the North Sea in 
the 1960s. Deindustrialization followed because the discovery of this natural 
resource raised the value of the Dutch guilder, making manufactured goods less 
competitive with those of other nations, thus increasing imports and decreasing 
exports.
 7.  For a review, see Lucas (2005, pp. 85–102).
 8.  See also Dumont and Lemaître (2004).
 9. In GATS, a treaty of the World Trade Organization, Mode 4 deals with the inter-
national movement of people in the process of delivering international trade in 
services.
 10. “Contracting” here refers to a firm taking on a project abroad and bringing work-
ers from abroad to execute this project.
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There are two salient features of many writings on human capital 
in developing countries. First, a fraction of the educated workforce mi-
grates to developed countries. Since educated workers are one of the 
scarcest resources in developing countries, it has been argued that the 
migration of educated workers is a “brain drain” for the developing 
countries.1 Second, in a number of developing countries, a large frac-
tion of the educated workforce is unemployed. For example, in their in-
fluential development economics textbook, Economics	of	Development, 
Gillis et al. (1996) allude to the Sri Lankan experience as a striking ex-
ample, noting that half of the country’s new university graduates were 
unemployed in the 1970s.2 The phenomenon of educated unemploy-
ment in those developing countries contrasts sharply with the pattern 
of unemployment in developed countries. In the latter, the unemploy-
ment rate and educational attainment are strongly negatively correlated 
(Ashenfelter and Ham 1979).
However, while there has been extensive research on the brain 
drain,3 the issue of “educated unemployment” has attracted little atten-
tion in the economics literature, despite references to its importance in 
development economics textbooks. A notable exception is an article by 
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). In a fixed-wage framework, Bhagwati 
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and Hamada argue that a high foreign wage can increase the fixed wage 
rate of the educated in the home country by affecting people’s psychol-
ogy and that, in turn, the higher fixed wage increases unemployment.4 
However, since educated unemployment is not a serious problem in 
all of the developing countries, Bhagwati and Hamada could not ex-
plain why a high foreign wage affects the psychology of people in some 
countries but not in others.
This chapter provides an alternative model of educated unemploy-
ment. In the model developed here, educated unemployment is caused 
by the prospect of international migration, that is, by the possibility 
of a brain drain. In a simple job-search framework we show that an 
individual’s reservation wage in the labor market of the home country 
increases with the probability of working abroad. Consequently, work-
ers who fail to line up employment abroad are less likely to immedi-
ately immerse themselves in work in their home country. Instead, they 
enter unemployment in order to engage in a repeated attempt to secure 
foreign employment. Thus, we provide a new explanation for the phe-
nomenon of educated unemployment observed in developing countries. 
Our theoretical analysis provides a basis and a rationale for rigorous 
empirical tests of this important phenomenon—tests that, to the best 
of our knowledge, are absent in the received literature. Moreover, our 
main argument that international migration and educated unemploy-
ment are closely linked seems to be consistent with considerable anec-
dotal evidence and policy-related research.5
We integrate the educated unemployment–international migration 
perspective with the recent literature on the “beneficial brain drain,”6 
which contends that compared to a closed economy, an economy open 
to migration differs not only in the opportunities that workers face but 
also in the structure of the incentives that they confront: higher prospec-
tive returns to human capital in a foreign country impinge favorably 
on human capital formation decisions at home. The analysis contained 
in this chapter shows that a developing country may end up with more 
educated workers despite the brain drain and educated unemploy-
ment. In other words, the average level of human capital in the country 
may well be higher under migration than in the absence of migration. 
This higher level can play a positive role in determining long-run fu-
ture output growth, the present-day gloom of educated unemployment 
notwithstanding.
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The next two sections of this chapter, “Migration and educated un-
employment” and “The choice of acquiring higher education,” set up 
the basic analytical framework and present a model of educated unem-
ployment. The fourth section presents an analysis demonstrating that 
the prospect of international migration can lead to a “brain gain” de-
spite brain drain and the possibility of being unemployed after acquir-
ing a higher level of education. The final section offers conclusions and 
complementary reflections.
MIgRATIoN AND EDUCATED UNEMPLoYMENT
Consider a world that consists of two countries: home, H, and for-
eign, F. Country H is developing and is poorer than country F, which 
is developed. Because of a policy of selective migration by F, only ed-
ucated individuals (say, university graduates) of H have a chance of 
working in, hence migrating to, F.
In this section we analyze the behavior of the home country’s edu-
cated individuals. In the next section we incorporate into the model the 
cost of education and we analyze the decision to acquire education.
For our purposes, we assume that everyone in H is educated. The 
decision-making process of an educated individual is illustrated by Fig-
ure 3.1. According to this model, an educated individual makes deci-
sions in (at most) three stages:7
The	first	stage. When an individual graduates from a university in 
H, the individual participates in a lottery draw that results in probable 
work in F. If the individual obtains a winning ticket, his income will be 
wf. The probability of being selected to work in F is p.
The second stage. (Note that there is no second stage for individu-
als who win the draw.) An individual who graduates and fails to secure 
work in F faces the following choices: to work or to wait for another 
draw. Waiting for another draw frees up time to search for a job in F. 
Alternatively, if the individual were to work, little time (and energy) 
would be available for preparing applications and, in addition, the indi-
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vidual’s academic qualifications could depreciate, thereby lowering the 
probability of being picked up for work in F.8
The assumption that individuals choose unemployment while wait-
ing for another draw of going abroad is particularly consistent with the 
job-search theory. In fact, the assumption that the probability of finding 
a (new) job is higher when an individual does not hold a job, but in-
stead concentrates on searching for a job, is at the heart of the literature 
on job search and the natural rate of unemployment (Mortensen 1986; 
Acemoglu and Shimer 1999; Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright 2005). The 
rationale underlying this assumption is that searching for a job requires 
time and effort. The received job-search theory refers to domestic mar-
kets. It is reasonable to assume that finding a job in a foreign labor 
market requires even more time and effort.9 
For simplicity’s sake, we assume that if the individual works, he 
cannot participate in any additional draw, so his probability of ending 
up working in F is zero. If the individual does not work and awaits an-
other draw, his chances of going abroad are p'.
The third stage. (Note that the third stage only applies to those who 
waited for another draw in the second stage.) If an individual wins this 
draw, he will go abroad. Otherwise, he will work at home, receiving the 
home country’s mean wage rate.
The job offers in the second and third stage follow an independently 
identical distribution. The cumulative distribution function of the wage 
offer, w, is F(w). We assume that F(w) is differentiable. We also assume 
that
 w∈[wl , wh] 
and that the density function,  
dF(w) ≡ F'(w) , 
		dw
is strictly positive in its domain, that is,            
F'(w) > 0  ∀w∈[wl,wh] .
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                  _
(3.1)  (1 − p')w + p'wf ,
     _    







In the second stage, if the individual receives a wage offer w at H, 
he will accept it if and only if
          1    _(3.2) w > 1 + r [(1 − p')w + p'w
f] ,
        
where r is the individual’s discount rate.
We define
           1     _(3.3) wc ≡ 1 + r [(1 − p')w + p'w
f] .
In this case, the individual will accept the wage offer at H if and only if 
w > wc. Thus, wc is the individual’s reservation wage at H.
Further simplifying, we assume that
           1    _(3.4) wl ≥  1 + r w ;
educated unemployment will not exist in the absence of an additional 
possibility of migration (that is, when p' = 0).10
Then, the fraction of the educated who are unemployed11 is
(3.5) u ≡ P (w ≤ wc) = F(wc) .
Clearly,
(3.6)  du = du		dw
c
  dp'			dw
c	dp'   _
                  = F'	w
f − w  .    1 + r      
˜
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Note that the assumption that F is developed and H is developing natu-
rally implies that w f	>	w. Since F' > 0 ,
(3.7) du  > 0 .
 dp'
In addition, we note that
      1     _       _wc ≡  1 + r 
[w + p'	(w f − w)]
 
and that
      du			_
		 p'
(3.8) d(wf − w) = F' 1 + r  > 0 .






Proposition 1 implies that in a developing country, educated un-
employment is caused by the prospect of international migration, that 
is, by the possibility of a brain drain. The greater the probability of be-
ing selected for work in the foreign country and the greater the wage 
gap between the foreign country and the developing country, the more 
serious the educated unemployment problem. The intuition underlying 
the proposition is straightforward. From Equation (3.3) we can see that 
wc	 increases with p' and with wf, and that it decreases with w, which 
means that the individual’s reservation wage in the home labor market 
increases with the probability of working abroad and with the interna-
tional wage gap. Consequently, the unemployment rate will increase as 
the reservation wage rises.
Moreover, we have assumed for the sake of simplicity that only 
educated individuals (say, university graduates) of the home country 
have a chance of working in, hence migrating to, the foreign country. If 
we modify this assumption slightly, so that a better-educated individual 
in a developing country faces a higher probability of working abroad, 
then by similar logic to Proposition 1, we will obtain the result that the 
unemployment rate is higher for individuals with higher education.
_
_
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THE CHoICE oF ACqUIRINg HIgHER EDUCATIoN
The benefit that education without migration confers is simply H’s 
mean wage rate of educated workers, w. When migration is a possibil-
ity, the expected payoff from the three stages described in the preceding 
section is          
_       
wh	
         p'wf +(1 − p')w(3.9)	 V ≡ pwf + (1 + p) ∫wc wdF(w) + F(w
c)     1 + r									        
wh




          dV                    dwc(3.10)      dwf = p + (1 − p) −F'(w
c)wc + F'(wc)wc + F(wc) dwf         p'
 = p + (1 − p)F(wc) 1 + r > 0 .
Let us assume that
(3.11)   p' = p(1 + α) ,
where α is a fixed parameter. To ensure that 0 < p' < 1, we assume that 
                  1   −1 < α < p  − 1 . 
Then,
       dV              wh   dp = w
f − ∫wc	wdF(w) + F(wc)wc                 
_                (wf − w)(1 + α)(3.12)              + (1 − p) −F'(wc)wc	+ F'(wc)wc	+ F(wc)    1 + r         
wh
	 	 	 	 	 													_
 = wf − ∫wc	wdF(w) + F(wc)wc+ (1 − p)F(wc) 
(wf − w)(1 + α)
            1 + r
We further assume that
(3.13)   wf	>	wh .
_
.
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To rule out the unreasonable possibility that all the educated are unem-
ployed, we assume that
(3.14)   wc	<	wh . 
It follows that 
          
wh
  ∫wc	wdF(w) + F(w
c)wc
																			wh
    ≤ ∫wc	w
hdF(w) + F(wc)wh
               
wh
    = wh∫wc	dF(w) + F(w
c)wh
 = wh[F(wh) − F(wc)] + F(wc)wh
 =  wh	.
Therefore,
                        
wh
(3.15)   wf > ∫wc	wdF(w) + F(wc)wc ,
and it then follows from Equation (3.12) that
             dV(3.16)   dp > 0 ,
that is, the benefit of acquiring a university education in H increases as 
the probability of migration rises.
We next incorporate the cost of acquiring education. Our idea is 
that individuals differ in their abilities and familial background, hence 
in their cost of acquiring education. We normalize the size of the (pre-
migration) population of H to be Lebesgue measure 1. Suppose that an 
individual’s cost of obtaining education, c, follows the uniform distri-
bution	c∈[0,Ω] .
We assume that the (lifetime) income of an uneducated individual 
is constant, and we denote it by Φ. Then, recalling the assumption that 
only individuals with university degrees have any chance of migrating, 
we see that an individual will choose to acquire a university education 
if and only if 
˜
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(3.17) V − c ≥ Φ . 
Let us define 
(3.18) c*	=	V − Φ . 
It follows that an individual will obtain a university education if and 
only if his cost of education maintains 
c ≤ c* .
Since c	follows a uniform distribution and the population size of the 
economy is of Lebesgue measure 1, both the proportion and the number 
of educated individuals are given by
               c*(3.19) Ω  .  
From Equation (3.18) we get
(3.20) d(c*/Ω) =  1 dV		> 0 ,                  dp         Ω dp	
where the inequality sign in Equation (3.20) follows from Equation 
(3.16). We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 2:	The	number	of	 individuals	undertaking	university	
education	will	increase	as	the	probability	of	migration	rises.
This proposition implies that while the prospect of migration causes 
the unemployment rate of educated individuals in the home country to 
increase (Equation [3.7]), it also induces more individuals to acquire 
education (Equation [3.20]). The end result may be an increase in the 
number of unemployed university graduates. Thus, Propositions 1 and 
2 provide an explanation for the phenomenon of educated unemploy-
ment by linking it to migration.
˜
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A BRAIN DRAIN vERSUS A BRAIN gAIN
In this section, akin to Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 
1998), we seek to examine whether the prospect of migration can re-
sult in a larger number of educated individuals in the home country. 
Since in our model only educated individuals have a positive probabil-
ity of migration, it follows that if the prospect of migration results in a 
larger number of educated individuals in the home country, then it will 
a	fortiori result in a higher fraction of educated individuals in the home 
country.
The following proposition shows that the brain gain caused by the 




p = 0	,	for	any	given	α , if w f > (3 + α)w	.
Proof: We first note that c* is a function of V and hence of p, so we 
define it as
(3.21) c* ≡ c(p) .
Then, under the migration prospect, the number of university graduates 
remaining in the developing country is
(3.22) c(p) − p	
c(p) + (1 − p) p'	c(p)F(wc)  Ω            Ω                       Ω




 c(p)(1 − p)[1 − p(1 + α)F(wc)] 
−
 c(0) ,  Ω                               Ω                          Ω
     K(p)so that   Ω    
is the difference between the number of educated individu-
_
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als in the home country when p > 0, and the number of educated indi-
viduals in the home country when p = 0.
Since 
K(p) ≡ c(p)(1 − p)[1 − p(1 + α)F(wc)] − c(0) ,
we know that 
K(0) = 0 
and that
K'(p) = c'(p)(1 − p) [1 − p(1 + α)F(wc)]            
_                       
− 1 − p(1 + α)F(w
c) + (1 − p)(1 + α)F(w
c)	+	pF'(wc) (w
f	−	w)(1 + α)
c(p)                 1 + r
We seek to show that K'(0) > 0 which, by the continuity of K(p), 
would imply that K(p) > K(0) in the small (positive) neighborhood of 
p = 0. Note that
K'(0) = c'(0) − [1 + (1 + α)F(wc)]c(0) .
When p = 0, we know from the assumptions in Equations (3.4) and 
(3.11) that educated unemployment will not exist in the absence of an 
additional possibility of migration, which implies that wc = wl. Then, 
from the last line of Equation (3.12) and from the consideration that 
F(wl) = 0, we get            
_
dV                     wh	 	 	 	 																									(wf − w)(1 + α)
dp │p=0 = w
f − ∫wc	wdF(w) + F(wc)wc + (1 − p)F(wc)         1 + r                  
                         
wh	 	 	 	 																									(wf − w)(1 + α)       = wf − ∫wl	wdF(w) + F(wl)wl + (1 − p)F(wl)          1 + r                     
(3.23) = wf − w	.
Also, from the equality in Equation (3.20)	, we know that 
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Therefore,
                
_	 dc(p) | p=0 = c'(0) = dV		| p=0 = wf − w .  	dp		 	 			dp
          _
When p = 0, V = w . Hence, from (3.18) and the definition c* = c(p) , 
we get 
(3.24) c(0)  = V − Ф
        = w − Φ .
Thus, K'(0) > 0 if and only if
         _         _
(3.25) wf − w −[1 + (1 + α)F(wc)](w − Φ) > 0 .
Since
1 + (1 + α)F(wc) < 2 + α ,
Equation (3.25) will be satisfied if
        _        _
wf − w − (2 + α)(w − Φ) > 0 ,
that is, if
                                  _
(3.26)	 wf  > (3 + α)w − (2 + α)Φ .
                        _
And since Φ > 0, it follows that when wf > (3 + α)w, Equation (3.26) 
will be satisfied, in which case we will have the result that 
K'(0) > 0. 
Hence, by the continuity of K(p), it must be that K(p) > K(0) in the small 
(positive) neighborhood of p = 0. ■
Proposition 3 shows that a developing country may end up with 
more university graduates despite the brain drain of university gradu-
ates. If we consider that there is a reduction of the population in the 
wake of migration, the proposition also implies that the developing 
_
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country may end up with a higher fraction of educated individuals, de-
spite the brain drain of university graduates.
Combining Propositions 1 and 3 yields the following corollary:
Corollary 1:	A	positive	 level	of	educated	unemployment	 in	a	de-
veloping	country	coexists	with	a	larger	number	of	university	graduates	
in	the	country	than	the	number	of	university	graduates	in	the	country	
under	no	educated	unemployment	if	w f > (3 + α)w.
Since there are fewer individuals in the country under feasible mi-
gration, and since there are more educated individuals in the country 
under feasible migration, it must follow that the average level of human 
capital in the country is higher under migration than in the absence of 
migration. This higher level can play a critical role in determining long-
run output growth, an issue to which we will turn in a future work.
CoNCLUSIoN
Since the late 1960s, the development economics literature has 
pointed to a stark connection between migration and unemployment: 
workers change their location, but not their productive attributes, in 
response to an expected wage at destination that is higher than their 
wage at origin, only to end up unemployed (Todaro 1969). We propose 
a different connection between migration and unemployment wherein 
workers move into unemployment at origin in response to an expected 
wage at destination, and workers improve their productive attributes. 
While the flight of human capital and the unemployment of human cap-
ital occupied the center stage of development economics at about the 
same time (the 1970s), analysts and policymakers did not make a causal 
connection between the two phenomena except for noting that unem-
ployment induced a desire to migrate. Our analysis considers a link: in a 
simple job-search framework, we show that an individual’s reservation 
wage in the home labor market increases with the probability of work-
ing abroad. Thus, our model implies that such unemployment would 
be smaller in the absence of the migration possibility. Furthermore, we 
integrate our model into the recent literature of beneficial brain drain. 
The analysis shows that a developing country may end up with more 
_
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educated individuals despite the brain drain and educated unemploy-
ment. Our theoretical analysis provides a basis and a rationale for rig-
orous empirical tests of the link between international migration and 
educated unemployment, which are absent in the received literature. 
Such empirical endeavors will constitute an interesting topic for future 
research.
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 1. For a systematic review of this argument see Bhagwati and Wilson (1989).
 2. Also, Mathew (1997) reports that in urban Kerala, India, in 1983, the unemploy-
ment rate of university graduates was 11.34 percent for males and 25.69 percent 
for females, which is much higher than the unemployment rate of those who 
had no education (3.52 percent for males and 1.52 percent for females) and than 
the unemployment rate of those who had up to primary education (6.73 per-
cent for males and 8.43 percent for females). More recently, Bourdarbat (2004) 
shows that in 2000, the unemployment rate of university graduates in Morocco 
was about four times that of individuals who had acquired less than six years of 
schooling.
  3. The topic of the brain drain is also regularly taken up in the informed press (see 
the short overview in Stark [2004]).
  4. For example, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974, p. 20) state, “The presence of in-
ternational income-inequality implies that, for the educated elite which is better 
informed about the developed world, and more integrated therewith regarding 
the notions of a ‘good life’ and related values, the salary levels demanded and 
fixed by the elite groups tend to reflect the salary levels of comparable groups in 
the more developed countries.”
  5. For example, see King (1987) and Tullao (1982).
  6. For example, see Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 1998); Mountford 
(1997); and Stark and Wang (2002).
  7. We assume that relative to the duration of the individual’s working life, the dura-
tion of the three stages is short.
  8. Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) show that “working experience in the source 
country yields virtually no return in the host country.”
  9. Information on the employment status of migrants at home in developing coun-
tries prior to migration is scanty. Rudimentary studies suggest that on several 
occasions, nearly half of the migrants from India were unemployed prior to mi-
gration (Srivastava and Sasikumar 2003). Additional empirical work on the em-
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ployment status of individuals prior to their international migration would be of 
considerable interest.
 10. Although this assumption is not necessary, resorting to it highlights the notion 
that educated unemployment is caused by the prospect of migration.
 11. Note that in the current model, to facilitate our concentrating on essentials, unem-
ployment applies only to stage 2 of the individuals’ decision-making processes.
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How Does Migration 
Affect Local Development? 
What Mexico’s Experience Tells Us
Christopher Woodruff
University	of	California,	San	Diego
Close to 200 million people live in a country other than that of their 
birth. Driven by large differences among countries in the wage rates 
paid to workers, the number of migrants worldwide continues to grow 
by about 3 percent a year. The largest share of these migrants move 
from developing to developed countries and have low to moderate edu-
cation levels. A recent World Bank report (2005) estimates that in 2005 
migrants returned $167 billion to their countries of origin.1 Remittance 
flows have increased even more rapidly than migrant flows in recent 
years. According to the World Bank data, remittances more than quin-
tupled between 1990 and 2005, an annual growth rate of 12 percent. 
The amount of remittances is now comparable to the flow of foreign 
direct investment and is about twice the size of foreign aid flows (World 
Bank 2005). 
The 10 million Mexican migrants in the United States represent 
about 5 percent of the world migrant total. The $20 billion they sent 
home in 2005 represents more than 10 percent of world remittance 
transfers. As these measures underscore, the Mexico–United States mi-
gration pattern is surely the largest unilateral flow of people (in one 
direction) and resources (in the other) in the world.2 For Mexico, mi-
gration to the United States is a significant economic and demographic 
phenomenon. Around 10 percent of individuals born in Mexico cur-
rently reside in the United States. The remittances these migrants send 
back to Mexico represent only about 2.5 percent of Mexico’s national 
income. However, Mexican migration is geographically concentrated. 
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In some states, remittances represent more than 10 percent of income, 
and in some regions within states, a much higher percentage. 
Both migration flows from Mexico and remittance flows to Mexico 
have grown rapidly in the past decade, mirroring international trends. 
The U.S. Census Bureau (2003) estimates that the Mexican-born popu-
lation of the United States increased by 4.8 million during the 1990s 
and has continued to increase by 400,000 to 500,000 annually since. 
The Bank of Mexico (Banco de México 2007) estimates that remit-
tances totaled $2.5 billion in 1990, $5.6 billion in 1998, and $20 billion 
in 2005, a 1990–2005 annual growth rate of 15 percent. 
In what ways might these growing remittances affect the circum-
stances of households in sending countries (that is, countries that send 
migrants abroad)? Given the large sums flowing as remittances, it is 
easy to forget that remittances are actually large numbers of small flows: 
a typical recipient household in Mexico receives a few hundred dollars 
a month. This gives remittances a very different character from other 
international flows, such as foreign direct investment or international 
aid. Remittances flow to individuals, usually to those residing in house-
holds in the lower part of the income distribution. A growing number 
of researchers are examining the impact of remittances on household 
economic outcomes. I will summarize what we have learned from these 
studies and will also highlight an issue that makes isolating the impact 
of migration or remittances on the economies of sending countries very 
difficult. 
MEASURINg THE IMPACT oF MIgRATIoN
How can we measure the impact of migration on economic out-
comes in sending countries? The simplest way would be to compare 
households with migrants and households without migrants. But in fact, 
such a comparison might be very misleading, because of the nature of 
migrants themselves. Migrants are not (or at least, are seldom) random-
ly selected from the population. For the most part, individuals, or indi-
vidual households, choose to migrate, and others choose not to migrate, 
for a wide variety of reasons. Some characteristics that affect the likeli-
hood of migrating are easy to measure. For instance, the relative returns 
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to university education in Mexico are greater than in the United States. 
Thus, we might expect fewer individuals with a university education 
to migrate. This we can easily measure. But international migration in-
volves risk—the risk of not finding a job and the risk of traveling, pri-
marily. So less risk-averse individuals or households may also be more 
likely to migrate. However, risk aversion is difficult to measure, and it 
may affect a variety of other economic decisions and outcomes. 
The connection between migrant households and the formation of 
microenterprises, an important element in the economies of sending 
nations, suggests the complex interplay of forces to be considered in 
analyzing the causes and effects of migration. If starting a household 
business requires capital, and if capital markets function poorly, then 
money earned abroad might be an important source of capital to start a 
business. In fact, data from the 2000 Mexican population census indi-
cate that there is a strong connection between migration and the forma-
tion of microenterprises. Table 4.1 shows self-employment rates among 
household heads, both in households with and in households without 
migrants, as measured by the census.3 In both urban and rural areas, and 
for both males and females, household heads are more likely to be self-
employed in households with migrants.
Might this difference be caused by migration? Is it the result of re-
mittance flows from migrants? Perhaps. But it also is possible that both 
migration and self-employment are caused by some third factor that is 
difficult to control for in making the comparison. Those who choose to 
migrate may have more energy and be more entrepreneurial than those 
who choose not to migrate. Those people who tend to be more entre-
Table 4.1  Self-Employment Rates in Mexico (%)
With migrant in family Without migrant in family
Urban males 36.8 27.4
Rural males 44.9 36.6
Urban females 38.0 26.8
Rural females 44.0 37.0
NOTE: Data are for adults aged 18–65. Sampling weights are used so that the sample 
represents all urban (population more than 100,000) and all rural (population less than 
15,000) areas.
SOURCE: Mexican 2000 census population data.
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preneurial may be both more likely to migrate and more likely to enter 
self-employment. 
Untangling cause and effect is the challenge. Ideally, we would ob-
serve a group of identical individuals, some of whom migrate and some 
of whom do not. Differences between the groups would then be attrib-
utable to migration. However, except in a few cases where migrants in 
formal programs are chosen by lottery, this is not likely to be possible. 
So we have to look for alternative ways of finding appropriate subsets of 
the population to compare with migrants. In Mexico, I would argue, we 
can make use of the fact that migrants historically have come dispropor-
tionately from a certain region of the country. A key to identifying the 
impacts of migration on households in Mexico is that, at least histori-
cally, a handful of states in central-western Mexico have provided more 
than half of the migrants to the United States. I will refer to this region 
as the high-migration region. With some additional assumptions, we 
can compare outcomes of households in the high-migration region with 
outcomes of households in other, low-migration regions of Mexico. 
Why do we need additional assumptions? Well, migration to anoth-
er country requires some entrepreneurial initiative and a lot of energy. 
Sometimes people of a given region have a reputation for being particu-
larly entrepreneurial. Before we compare households in the high-migra-
tion region with those in low-migration regions, we need to rule out the 
possibility that those in the high-migration region are not, collectively, 
more entrepreneurial or energetic.
There are two steps to eliminating this possibility. First, we need 
to ascertain that the differences in migration rates across regions are 
caused by factors other than differences in individual initiative. Here, 
understanding the origins of migration patterns is critical. Because 
early migration patterns are interesting and, it turns out, important to 
identifying the impacts of migration in Mexico, I will discuss them in 
some detail.
Second, even if differences in migration were caused by factors 
other than the characteristics of the people in the regions, we need to be 
sure that migration rates are not correlated by happenstance with char-
acteristics that might lead to favorable economic outcomes.
In the 1990s, fully a third of the migrants to the United States came 
from one of three states in central-western Mexico: Jalisco, Michoacán, 
and Guanajuato (Rodríguez Ramírez 2003). Residents of these states 
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were roughly twice as likely to migrate as the average Mexican. Just 1.5 
percent of migrants came from the four states east of the Isthmus of Te-
huantepec—Chiapas, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo—which 
are home to 7 percent of the population. 
Why did the central-western region of Mexico become such an 
important source of migrants? The answer turns out to be railroads. 
The first wave of migration from Mexico to the United States occurred 
early in the twentieth century. Demand for labor in the United States 
increased when migration from Europe slowed with the start of World 
War I. Many Mexican workers were recruited to help build rail lines 
in the southwestern United States. At the time, northern Mexico was 
scarcely populated. Thus, labor recruiters from the United States looked 
to the interior of Mexico. Recruiters chose as their destinations the in-
terior states they could reach most quickly and at the lowest cost. These 
were the states accessible by rail.4
Figure 4.1 shows a map of Mexico with the major north-south rail 
lines as they existed around 1900. There were three major north-south 
rail lines in Mexico at that time, each built between 1884 and 1900. 
The first, the Central Mexican Railroad, went south from what is now 
Ciudad Juarez to Irapuato in the state of Guanajuato, where it branched 
east to Mexico City and west through Guadalajara to Colima near the 
Pacific Coast. In the north, the Central Mexican Railroad connected 
to the Southern Pacific and Texas Pacific railroads in Texas. A second 
line, the Mexican International Railroad, ran a shorter distance, from 
Durango through Chihuahua to Piedras Negras, then connected with 
the Southern Pacific in Eagle Pass, Texas. A third, the Mexican National 
Railroad, traveled north from Mexico City through San Luis Potosí and 
Monterrey, reaching the border at Nuevo Laredo, just across the Rio 
Grande from the southeastern Texas town of Laredo. This third line was 
less well connected to rail lines in the United States. 
The state of Jalisco and its capital, Guadalajara, represented the 
closest area with a large population that was directly linked by rail. As 
a result, Guadalajara became the center of the high-migration region. 
By one estimate (Foerster 1925), 44 percent of migrants registering 
in Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California came from just three 
states in Mexico: Jalisco (20 percent), Michoacán (14 percent), and 
Guanajuato (10 percent). (In 1920, these four U.S. states were home 
to more than 90 percent of the Mexican-born population in the United 
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States [Borjas and Katz 2005].) Another source puts the share of mi-
grants to the United States coming from these three Mexican states at 
33 percent over the 1926–1932 period (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 
2001). Foerster’s 1924 data suggest that almost no migrants came from 
the states east of the isthmus of Tehuantepec; the present-day states of 
Chiapas, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo were not connected 
by rail to the rest of Mexico and collectively accounted for less than 1 
percent of the migrants in 1924. 
Early migration was very highly correlated with distance to the rail-
road. The state-level correlation between distance to the rail lines and 
migration rates in the 1920s is 0.78. Of course, now few migrants travel 
to the United States by rail. Do the early rail lines remain an impor-
tant factor in explaining the states of origin of migrants? The answer is 
yes. Early migrants provided information to others in their communities 
about opportunities for work in the United States. During the 1990s—
long after railroads stopped being the main means of transportation 
north—the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, and Guanajuato remained the 
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three states with the largest number of migrants going to the United 
States. Each accounted for about 11 percent of the national total, and 
collectively they accounted for 33.3 percent—almost exactly the same 
as the 33 percent share that Durand, Massey and Zenteno (2001) cite 
for the 1926–1932 period.5 Overall, the state-level correlation between 
migration in the 1920s and migration in the second half of the 1990s 
is 0.43; the correlation between migration during the second half of 
the 1950s and the second half of the 1990s is 0.71. The early migrants 
established networks, which reproduced themselves. 
Both the data and the historical accounts suggest that the early rail 
lines caused the central-western states in Mexico to become the most 
important source of migrants. This resulting pattern, consistent over de-
cades, opens the possibility that comparing outcomes in high- and low-
migration states might provide insights into the impact of migration on 
local development. But we don’t quite yet have a convincing story. We 
must first address concerns that present-day differences between people 
in high- and low-migration regions may stem from factors other than 
migration. Perhaps people from the high-migration region are differ-
ent merely by chance, and the differences themselves did not cause the 
migration. Or perhaps the rail lines caused differences in outcomes, not 
just in the migration that they facilitated. Researchers who have relied 
on differences in historical migration rates to identify the impacts of 
migration in Mexico have concluded that neither of these is the case. I 
leave the details of their evidence to later in the chapter, where I discuss 
their results. For now, I will say only that the data indicate that the high-
migration states were, on average, poorer than low-migration states 
during the first half of the twentieth century. Hence, premigration mea-
sures of health, education, and income are lower in the high-migration 
regions. A finding that households in high-migration regions now have 
better outcomes implies that they have overcome this initial disadvan-
tage. If anything, it appears that using historical migration regions as a 
laboratory to observe migration’s economic effects is likely to provide 
a conservative estimate of the impacts of migration. 
Remittances and Migration
The 2000 Mexico population census asks whether any member 
of the household has migrated outside of Mexico during the past five 
Pozo Book.indb   57 4/18/2007   10:03:14 AM
58   W
oodruff
Figure 2: Migration rates by state, 1995-2000 
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years. Slightly less than 5 percent of households report having at least 
one migrant to the United States. Figure 4.2 shows a map of Mexico’s 
32 states, labeled with the percentage of households in the state that had 
migrants during the years between 1995 and 2000. The first column 
of Table 4.2 shows the same data. As noted above, there is significant 
variation in migration rates across states. Most of the high-migration 
states are located in central-western Mexico, with the highest rates be-
ing found in the states of Zacatecas (which has migration from 15.1 
percent of households), Michoacán (13.0 percent), and Guanajuato 
(11.4 percent). States in southeastern Mexico have the lowest rates: 
Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán, and Quintana Roo all have rates below 
1.3 percent. 
The census survey also asks whether members of the household 
have received money from family members living in another country. 
Just over 3 percent of households report that one or more members re-
ceive remittances. The percentage of individuals in each state receiving 
remittances is shown in column 2 of Table 4.2. At the state level, the 
correlation between migration and remittance rates in the 2000 census 
(columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.2) is 0.95.
What are the characteristics of households receiving remittances? 
Several patterns are apparent in the data. First, rural households are 
much more likely to receive remittances than urban households. Just 
under 5 percent of households in localities with fewer than 5,000 inhab-
itants report that they receive remittances, compared to just under 2 per-
cent of households in urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants. 
By education level, the general pattern is that the lower the education 
level of the household head, the more likely the household is to receive 
remittances. Among households whose heads have five or fewer years 
of schooling, 5.3 percent report receiving remittances. Among those 
with six years of schooling, 3.1 percent say they receive remittances, 
and among those with 12 or more years of schooling, 1.2 percent report 
receiving remittances. The pattern in education is consistent with the 
fact that schooling attainment is lower in rural areas. At each schooling 
level, rural households are about twice as likely to receive remittances 
as are urban households.
Since there is a strong correlation between the schooling level of 
the household head and household income, we can say in sum that rural 
and lower-income households are more likely to receive remittances 
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Table 4.2  State-Level Data on Households with Migrants and on 
Households Receiving Remittances (%)
NOTE: Correlation of the percentage of households with migrants and the percentage 
of households with remittances is 0.953. All averages are calculated using the factor 
weights provided in the census to reproduce the population of each state.
SOURCE: Mexican 2000 census population data.
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than are urban and higher-income households. Because rural and low-
er-income households are those most affected by infant mortality and 
early dropout rates, we might expect remittances to have an effect on 
these outcomes. And because self-employment in Mexico is strongly 
negatively correlated with schooling attainment, we might also expect 
remittances to affect the rate of self-employment. And, finally, if re-
mittances raise household income, then the direct effect of remittances 
should tend to reduce income inequality.
Remittances or Migration?
Using the historical migration networks to identify an appropriate 
group of households to compare with migrant households helps to re-
solve the problem of endogeneity arising from missing information. But 
we should be careful about which effects we seek to identify through 
the historical migration networks. Briefly put, the historical networks 
allow us to identify the long-run impacts of migration on local devel-
opment. By themselves, the historical migration networks don’t allow 
us to separate the impact of remittances from other impacts related to 
migration. For example, migrants living abroad may gain knowledge 
or formal education that will affect their behavior when they return to 
their home country. This appears to be a part of the story where health 
outcomes are concerned. 
Of course, remittances are likely to be the most important channel 
through which migration affects development. But they may not be the 
only channel. Even though the historical migration patterns are highly 
correlated with current remittance flows, when we use the historical 
migration in a two-stage least squares setup, we will identify only this 
long-run historical component. Identifying the impact of remittances 
per se will require a different instrument. For instance, short-run rainfall 
shocks might be expected to correlate with remittance flows; however, 
the rainfall shocks are likely to affect most of the other outcomes we are 
interested in measuring. 
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USINg HISToRICAL MIgRATIoN NETWoRkS To  
IDENTIFY THE IMPACTS oF MIgRATIoN
Several researchers have used Mexico’s historical migration net-
works to identify the impacts of migration on many different outcomes. 
I will focus the discussion here on three outcomes: capital for microen-
terprises, health, and education. With one exception, the authors I refer 
to claim to be identifying the impact of migration over the long term 
rather than the short term. 
As the data in Table 4.1 indicate, self-employment is very common 
in Mexico. In urban areas, close to a quarter of the labor force is self-
employed. The majority (about 60 percent) of these workers have no 
employees. The remaining 40 percent are split almost equally between 
those who “hire” only unpaid family workers and those who hire at 
least one paid-wage worker. The raw data in Table 4.1 appear to sug-
gest that migration is associated with entry into self-employment, since 
percentages of those who are self-employed range from 7 to 11 percent 
higher in the four demographic categories if they have a migrant in the 
family. 
Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) examine the impact of migration 
on microenterprises. Migration may affect either the supply of capi-
tal available to invest in microenterprises or the demand for products 
produced by microenterprises. (Massey and Parrado [1994] coined the 
term “migradollars” to describe the latter phenomenon.) Remittances 
flowing into a community increase the spending power of its residents. 
When asked how they spend remittances, respondents of most sur-
veys indicate that 90 percent or more of the money is spent on current 
consumption (immediate needs). This spending increases demand for 
goods sold by local stores. Since about a third of microenterprises are 
involved in retail trade, migradollars may have a significant impact on 
the sales—and hence on the capital investments—of microenterprises. 
In order to separate the demand-side and supply-side impacts of 
remittances on microenterprise investments, Woodruff and Zenteno 
(2007) focus on a group they refer to as internal migrants—the subset of 
individuals who reside in a Mexican state other than their state of birth. 
They argue that migration networks survive not only across time but 
across space as well. Using 2000 population census data, they show that 
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people living in the same state are more likely to receive remittances 
if they were born in high-migration states rather than in low-migration 
states. 
In other words, consider two households living in Mexico City, one 
whose head was born in Michoacán (high migration) and one whose 
head was born in Yucatán (low migration). The former is significantly 
more likely to receive remittances. Since these two individuals live in 
the same city, they face similar demand-side impacts from migradol-
lars flowing into that city. But as the result of migration networks, they 
have different access to capital. Thus, by focusing on internal migrants, 
Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) are able to isolate the impact of migra-
tion on the supply of capital to microenterprises.
Examining first the effect of migration on the decision to be self-
employed, Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) find no significant correlation 
between migration and entry into self-employment, instrumenting for 
migration with either the historical migration rates or with the distance 
of the state to the railroad network circa 1910. This suggests that the cor-
relation found in Table 4.1 more likely reflects the fact that households 
that are more entrepreneurial are both more likely to have migrants and 
more likely to start an enterprise, and that migration has no causal effect 
on the formation of microenterprises in urban areas in Mexico.
However, Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) do find a clear and robust 
association between migration and the amount of capital invested in 
household enterprises. By their estimate, migration is causally associ-
ated with about one-quarter of all capital invested in microenterprises 
located in urban areas in Mexico. Table 4.3 shows the results they report 
on the impact of migration on investment in each of five investment 
categories. The largest effect is on vehicles. Since the authors are un-
able to separate returned migrants from those investing remittances sent 
by others, it is likely that part of this effect reflects the frequency with 
which migrants return to Mexico with a vehicle purchased in the United 
States. But investments in inventories and (more marginally) in tools 
and equipment are also significantly associated with migration. 
The basic results provide support for the importance of remittances 
as a source of capital in microenterprises. But what effect does that 
capital have on the sales and earnings of the enterprises? Here the an-
swer appears to differ according to the capital intensity of the sector. 
In high-capital sectors, migration is associated with higher investment, 
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higher sales, and higher profits. In low-capital sectors, there is a much 
smaller positive impact on investment and profits, and no impact on 
sales. These results suggest that remittances from migration relieve 
capital constraints where they are more likely to bind—in high-capi-
tal sectors. But enterprises in low-capital sectors might be viewed as a 
place to stash the liquidity coming from migration, without generating 
such dramatic effects on the operation of the enterprise. 
Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) are interested in the impact of 
migration on child health outcomes in Mexico. Here, the methodologi-
cal problem they encounter is that healthier families may be more likely 
to migrate, hence a positive correlation between healthy children and 
migration may be the result of causation in either direction. To avoid 
this problem, the authors use state-level historical migration data as an 
instrument for current migration. Yet they still must address the con-
cern that historical migration is associated either positively or nega-
tively with contemporaneous health conditions. However, they find that 
migration rates in 1924 are not significantly correlated with child mor-


















State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of 
observations
1,675 1,675 1,675 1,675 1,675
R-squared 0.13 0.42 0.34 0.41 0.34 
NOTE: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the state 
level for the state of birth. Sample limited to owners 18–65 years of age working at 
least 35 hours per week. The migration rate is instrumented with the distance from 
the north-south railway lines, as described in the text. In addition to the variables 
shown, all regressions include seven variables indicating the sector of activity. Other 
controls included in the regression are years of schooling of the owner, the estimated 
labor market experience (age minus years of schooling minus 6), the age of the firm in 
years, the square of each of these variables, a dummy indicating that the owner reports 
data for two enterprises, and the income per capita in the owner’s state of birth.
SOURCE: Woodruff and Zenteno (2007).
Table 4.3  Log of Replacement Cost of Invested Capital by Type  
of Investment
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They also find that historical migration rates are largely uncorrelated 
with measures of health services in 1996. 
Hildebrandt and McKenzie find that migration has a large and sig-
nificant impact on the well-being of children in Mexico. They use data 
from the 1997 Mexican demographic survey of households known as 
ENADID, which includes information on whether anyone from the 
household has ever migrated.6 Because they are interested in the impact 
of migration on children after the act of migration, they define migrant 
households as those households with at least one migrant going to the 
United States before the beginning of 1994, and nonmigrant households 
as those with no migrants or later migrants. Hildebrandt and McKenzie 
report positive effects of migration on the health of children in Mexico 
once the endogeneity of migration is taken into account. The effects are 
large. Migration is associated with about a 3.0-percentage-point reduc-
tion in the probability of a baby dying in the first year of life, and an in-
crease in birth weight of 350 grams, or around 0.8 pounds. The authors’ 
OLS results suggest no significant correlation between migration and 
health. The lack of significance in the OLS regressions combined with 
the significant positive outcomes found in the instrumental variable 
regressions together suggest that the positive health outcomes them-
selves make migration less likely. Not all of the impacts of migration on 
children’s health are positive, however. Children born in migrant house-
holds are less likely to be vaccinated or to see doctors during the first 
year of their lives. Hildebrandt and McKenzie attribute this to greater 
time demands on the parent because of migration from the household. 
The findings of Hildebrandt and McKenzie are corroborated by 
López Córdoba (2005), who uses municipio (county) level data from 
the 2000 Mexican population census to examine the impact of migra-
tion and remittances on health and education. López Córdoba attempts 
to separate the impact of migration from the impact of remittances by 
using historical migration to control for migration and by using current 
remittance flows to measure remittances.7 Because historical migration 
rates are available only at the state level, López Córdoba proxies for 
historical migration by measuring the distance from each municipio to 
the nearest rail line existing in the 1920s, plus the distance from that 
point to the border. Since most migrants—and labor recruiters—trav-
eled by rail at that time, the distance proxies for the cost of migration. 
López Córdoba also includes a measure of the percentage of house-
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holds in each municipio that reported receiving remittances in 2000. 
His claim is, then, that the distance variable accounts for long-run im-
pacts of migration and allows for the isolation of the impact of current 
remittance flows, through the remittance variable. López Córdoba finds 
that infant mortality is decreasing in the share of households receiving 
remittances and increasing in the historical cost of migration. The latter 
implies again that migration is negatively associated with infant mor-
tality rates, since migration itself falls as migration costs rise. López 
Córdoba focuses his discussion on the magnitude of the effect of remit-
tances, which appears to be about a third of the magnitude of the effect 
reported by Hildebrandt and McKenzie. 
There is slightly more disagreement with respect to migration’s 
effect on educational attainment, but a general picture emerges from 
several studies addressing this issue. Several issues make understand-
ing the impact of migration on education particularly difficult. For one 
thing, most databases organize individuals by households. As early as 
age 16, children begin to split off to form their own households, or, 
more frequently, join the household of a relative in another city. Track-
ing the individual to the remittance behavior of the household then be-
comes impossible. Also, in urban areas, at earlier ages the children’s 
schooling attainment and attendance do not vary much, because prima-
ry schooling is universal in urban Mexico and lower secondary school-
ing is nearly so. 
With this in mind, Hanson and Woodruff (2003) study educational 
attainment in rural areas in Mexico among children 10–14 years of age. 
An issue for the analysis of dynamics in rural regions is that households 
seldom move from rural areas in one state to rural areas in another state. 
Thus, the strategy Woodruff and Zenteno (forthcoming) use to separate 
high-migration households and high-migration states is not available 
to Hanson and Woodruff. Instead, Hanson and Woodruff juxtapose the 
historical migration rates with household characteristics that are associ-
ated with migration, such as age and education of the mother. They find 
that migration has a positive effect on schooling in households in which 
the female head has two or fewer years of schooling. About a third of 
households in rural areas have female heads with two or fewer years of 
schooling. Among the two-thirds of the rural households in which the 
female head has higher levels of schooling, Hanson and Woodruff find 
a significant effect only among 10- to 12-year-old boys. 
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McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) use the ENADID 1997 survey in 
Mexico to examine the impact of migration on schooling outcomes 
among 12- to 18-year-olds in localities with populations below 50,000. 
They find that migration has a negative effect on schooling for both 
boys and girls 16–18 years of age, and a negative effect among boys 
aged 12–15. Hanson and Woodruff also find a negative effect among 
boys aged 13–15 whose mothers have three or more years of schooling. 
Among girls of the same age, Hanson and Woodruff find a positive, 
significant effect where mothers have low schooling and a negative, 
insignificant effect where mothers have three or more years of school-
ing. McKenzie and Rapoport attribute the negative effects of migration 
on schooling among 16- to 18-year-olds to a low return on education 
(since education obtained in Mexico has a low value in labor markets 
in the United States) and to higher opportunity costs caused by missing 
household members. However, it may also be the case that continuing 
on to high school requires moving out of the household to a city, since 
high schools are not common in rural areas. The question then is wheth-
er those who have stayed in school and left the household are reported 
as regular members of the household. If they are, then the results sug-
gest a strong negative impact of migration on educational attainment at 
higher levels. 
Finally, McKenzie and Rapoport (2004) examine the broader im-
pacts of migration on income inequality in Mexico, again using his-
torical migration as a means of identifying the impacts. They reach the 
interesting conclusion that migration initially increases inequality, be-
cause the cost of migration means that the poorest households do not 
migrate. However, once migration networks are established in a com-
munity, the costs of migrating fall. Members of poorer households then 
migrate with more frequency, and inequality is reduced. 
Most of the issues addressed in the research on impacts of migra-
tion—health, education, and capital for household enterprises—are 
particularly acute problems among the lower-income households in 
Mexico. With the exception of the suggestion that migration may have 
a negative impact on high school education, the research indicates that 
migration has a positive impact on economic outcomes in each of these 
areas. Since, as was noted earlier, remittances flow to lower-income 
(as measured by the schooling attainment of the head) and rural house-
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holds, this suggests that over the longer term, we should expect remit-
tances to reduce income inequality in Mexico.
CoNCLUSIoN
I have focused on the impacts of migration from a single country, 
Mexico. Households with members who migrate abroad are likely to 
differ in systematic ways from households without migrants. The dif-
ficulty in measuring all of the ways in which these two groups of house-
holds differ presents a challenge for those attempting to identify the im-
pacts of migration on sending countries. Is an observed difference the 
result of migration, or is it the cause of migration? Absent a strategy for 
identifying an appropriate comparison group, this is a difficult question 
to answer. For much of the past half-century, development economists 
have been primarily concerned with the negative impacts of migration 
on sending countries, such as brain drain. But an increasing number of 
studies examining diverse outcomes in Mexico are showing that migra-
tion has positive impacts there. Taken together, the studies also suggest 
that migration’s effects are complex. In Mexico, it appears that educa-
tional attainment increases for younger children but decreases for older 
children. Child mortality appears to decrease with migration, but so do 
visits to doctors and vaccinations. Self-employment rates in urban areas 
remain unchanged, but the level of capital investment in enterprises and 
the earnings derived from those enterprises increase.
Whether migration has similar effects in other sending countries 
is unclear. What is clear is that the best strategies for untangling these 
effects will vary from country to country and will take advantage of cir-
cumstances that allow for new insights into the phenomenon of remit-
tances. The key is not the specific instrument used to separate cause and 
effect, but the identification of an appropriate instrument for a given 
region or country. In Mexico, historical migration patterns are useful 
vehicles for comparison. In other countries, researchers have devised 
other novel strategies. One example of this is provided by Yang’s (2004) 
work measuring the impact of remittances in the Philippines. Yang uses 
the devaluation of Asian currencies in 1997–1998 to identify the im-
pacts of remittances on economic outcomes. This strategy is specific 
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to the Philippines, whose migrants are dispersed around the globe. The 
devaluation of many Asian currencies in the 1997–1998 period pro-
vided a nice natural shock to remittance flows into the Philippines: the 
Philippine peso value of remittances from migrants to the United States, 
or to Middle Eastern countries paying wages in dollars, increased when 
the Philippine currency was devalued. But since the Korean, Thai, and 
other Asian currencies were devalued at the same time, the remittances 
of workers in those countries did not similarly increase. 
It is not possible to exploit this kind of variation in Mexico or Cen-
tral America, where the vast majority of migrants go to a single coun-
try, the United States. However, isolation of the impacts of migration 
in Mexico, an important sending country, is possible because patterns 
of historical migration allow us to identify an appropriate comparison 
group against which to measure the progress of migrant households.
Most of the issues addressed in the research on impacts of migra-
tion—health, education, and capital for household enterprises—are 
particularly acute problems among the lower-income households in 
Mexico. With the exception of the suggestion that migration may have 
a negative impact on high school education, the research indicates that 
migration has a positive impact on economic outcomes. Since remit-
tances flow to lower-income (as measured by the schooling attainment 
of the head) and rural households, this suggests that over the long term 
we should expect remittances to contribute to a reduction of income 
inequality in Mexico.
Notes
 1. Remittance flows are sometimes divided into three categories: compensation for 
workers, remittances, and migrant transfers. The first two are differentiated by 
the length of time the worker is resident in the destination country and whether 
he or she is considered a resident there. Both of these are captured as current 
flows in the balance of payments. The third category is captured on the capital 
account side of balance of payments. Since governments often have a difficult 
time identifying current flows with precision, the sum of the three categories is 
likely to be more accurate than the individual categories. Even so, we should 
recognize that remittance flows are difficult to track and that the data provided 
are only estimates. 
  2. As of 2000, only Russia (12.2 million) had more emigrants than Mexico (10.1 
million), according to estimates (Parsons et al. 2005). About 95 percent of mi-
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grants from Mexico live in the United States, while the Russian diaspora is more 
dispersed geographically.
  3. The census distinguishes between households with and households without mi-
grants by asking whether anyone in the household has migrated during the past 
five years—that is, between 1995 and 2000. 
  4. Railroads were the only practical means for traveling long distances over land in 
Mexico in the early 1900s. According to Coatsworth (1972, pp. 86–93), stage-
coach travel in 1910 was three times as costly and was only one-fifth as fast. 
 5. Estimates by state vary slightly, but one reasonable estimate based on Mexican 
census data suggests that during the 1990s 11.1 percent came from Guanajuato, 
11.2 percent from Jalisco, and 11.0 percent from Michoacán (Rodríguez Ramírez 
2003).
 6. The survey is conducted at five-year intervals. ENADID stands for Encuesta 
Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica, or National Survey on Demographic 
Dynamics.
 7. López Córdoba uses the coefficient of variation in historical monthly rainfall as 
an instrument for current remittance receipts. He argues that higher variation in 
rainfall within the year gives rise to a greater need for consumption-smoothing 
strategies, including remittances.
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Remittance Patterns of 
Latin American Immigrants 
in the United States
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes
San	Diego	State	University
Migrant remittances, defined as transfers of funds from migrants 
in the United States to relatives or friends in their country of origin, 
have increasingly attracted the attention of policymakers as the large 
amounts of money involved and the role of remittances in economic 
development have become more evident. Indeed, at a macroeconomic 
level, remittances constitute one of the largest and least volatile sources 
of foreign exchange in many developing economies. The magnitude 
of these remittance flows is only expected to rise, given the increas-
ing out-migration experienced by many of these regions. As noted by 
de Vasconcelos (2005) of the Inter-American Development Bank, no-
where is this movement of workers and funds more important than in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, where domestic incomes and capital 
flows have been drying up following periods of economic crisis. Re-
mittances from the United States to Latin American and Caribbean na-
tions totaled more than $40 billion in 2004. This amount exceeded the 
combined flows of all foreign direct investment (FDI) and net official 
development assistance (ODA) to the region. De Vasconcelos goes on 
to note that the volume of remittances received by the Latin American 
and Caribbean countries is now the highest and fastest growing of any 
region in the world. Remittances surpass tourism income in each coun-
try of that region, account for at least 10 percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) in six countries, and almost always exceed a country’s 
largest export.
Perhaps the most popular task of economists studying the remit-
tance market in recent years has been the measurement of these flows. 
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In addition, the literature has tried to gain a better understanding of 
migrants’ remitting patterns and the microeconomic impacts of these 
patterns by examining who is likely to remit, for what purposes, and 
how remittances are ultimately used by the receiving families. Yet the 
lack of comparable survey instruments has impeded the completion of 
interesting cross-country comparisons that would shed some light on 
the role of socioeconomic, political, and cultural differences in explain-
ing migrants’ remittance patterns and how their families and friends 
ultimately use the funds they send back home.  
In this chapter, I use two surveys—the Mexican Migration Project 
and the Latin American Migration Project—designed to measure mi-
gration and migrants’ remitting patterns across several countries. The 
similitude of these two survey instruments allows for a comparative 
analysis. In particular, it permits us to uncover country-level similari-
ties and differences that are key in devising policies to facilitate these 
money flows and maximize their potential for improving the livelihood 
of migrants’ families back home. 
DATA 
The Mexican Migration Project (MMP93) reports only on Mexi-
co, whereas the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) reports on 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Peru.1 The 
LAMP is a companion project to the MMP93, which was begun in 1982 
to study the migration patterns of Mexicans within Mexico as well as 
Mexicans who have come to the United States. The MMP93 database 
includes detailed social, demographic, and economic information from 
approximately 16,000 households in 93 representative communities in 
17 of Mexico’s 31 states.2 The MMP93 survey was carried out annually 
in the winter months of 1982–1983 and 1987–2002.3 For each house-
hold, a complete life history is gathered on the household head, includ-
ing detailed information on past migration experiences in the United 
States (number and duration of trips, documentation used, etc.). After 
gathering information on these households, interviewers travel to the 
destination areas in the United States to administer identical question-
naires to households from the same communities in Mexico; these im-
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migrants have settled in the United States and no longer return home. 
Altogether, the 5,837 immigrants surveyed in the MMP93 constitute 
a reasonably representative data set on authorized and unauthorized 
Mexican immigrants in the United States (Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, 
and Pozo 2005; Massey and Zenteno 2000; Munshi 2003). 
The LAMP uses the same methodology as the MMP93 to expand 
our knowledge of migration in a variety of countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. So far, only one wave of data is available—that 
wave having been collected between 1999 and 2003, depending on the 
country under consideration. Because of this, when I explore house-
hold remittance-receiving patterns, I work with data from approximate-
ly 1,400 households from Costa Rica, a little under 1,000 households 
from the Dominican Republic, about 300 households from Haiti, almost 
1,800 households in Nicaragua, and close to 700 households from Peru. 
When investigating immigrants’ remitting patterns, I rely on data from 
approximately 192 immigrants from Costa Rica, 166 immigrants from 
the Dominican Republic, 36 immigrants from Haiti, 161 immigrants 
from Nicaragua, and 61 immigrants from Peru. 
MIgRATIoN AS THE PRECoNDITIoN To REMITTANCES
To the extent that remittances are money transfers from emigrants 
of a country to friends and relatives back in their countries of origin, 
these flows are conditional on the out-migration patterns of the receiv-
ing economies. As such, it is illuminating to ask the following ques-
tions about emigrants from each of these countries: What percentage of 
emigrants from these economies enter illegally into the United States? 
What percentage rely on smugglers to help them cross the border? How 
much do migrants pay, on average, for the smugglers’ services? Has 
the cost significantly increased during the past decade? Finally, how 
many trips do legal and unauthorized migrants in each of these coun-
tries make to the United States, on average? 
These questions all provide us with valuable information likely to 
influence remittance payments. For instance, countries with a higher 
proportion of unauthorized immigrants in the United States may be 
more likely to receive larger remittance flows. After all, unauthor-
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ized immigrants are exposed to higher income risks and, as such, 
may be more likely to remit money back home as an insurance mech-
anism in case the migration experience turns out to be unsuccessful 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006). Likewise, the broad use of smug-
gling services is likely to make the migratory experience more expen-
sive. The debt incurred often means that migrants must pay back imme-
diate family and relatives for funding their trip. Alternatively, migrants 
may have to foot the expenses for additional family members to come 
(Ilahi and Jafarey 1999). Finally, frequent trips back home may also 
influence how much money is remitted home on a periodic basis as 
opposed to being brought back home at the end of the migration experi-
ence (Bauer and Sinning 2005). 
Figures 5.1–5.3 and Tables 5.1A and 5.1B provide some combined 
migration statistics for all the countries included in this study as well 
as separate statistics for each country. Approximately 68 percent of the 
6,392 Latin American immigrants in the study, or about 4,350, are un-
authorized.4 Additionally, about 75 percent of illegal border crossers 
use smuggling services. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show these same categories 
broken down by immigrants’ country of origin. Mexico is the country 

















SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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we are most familiar with in this respect, given the predominance of 
Mexicans among all other immigrant groups in the United States. The 
percentage of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico is more than twice 
as high as the percentage from Nicaragua, the country with the next 
highest percentage of illegals. This may possibly be explained by the 
greater distance to be traveled in the case of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 
and the hazards of sea travel in the case of Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. Additionally, an even higher percentage of unauthorized im-
migrants rely on the services provided by smugglers in Costa Rica (91 
percent) and Nicaragua (81 percent) than do so in Mexico (74 percent). 
As such, the possibility exists that Costa Ricans and Nicaraguans remit 
substantial sums of money back home, either to pay back their own 
travel loans or to finance the comparatively more expensive trips of 
relatives. The lowest usage of smuggling is found among immigrants 
from the Dominican Republic. Because only a small number of obser-
vations are available for this country, it is difficult to ascertain why such 
low rates occur here. However, the lower use of smuggling services 




















SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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by Dominicans could be, in part, related to the lower realized success 
rate of smuggler-aided crossings among Dominicans in the survey com-
pared to the rate for unauthorized Dominicans who choose not to rely 
on these services.  
We also have information on the average number of crossings for 
legal versus unauthorized immigrants in each of the countries being 
surveyed (Figure 5.3). As we would expect, legal immigrants make a 
larger number of U.S. visits—three on average—than do unauthorized 
immigrants, who average two to almost three.5 Therefore, we would 
expect unauthorized immigrants to remit more money to their fami-
lies than legal immigrants, who can more easily return home and bring 
money back to their families in person.  
Tables 5.1A and 5.1B give the cost in U.S. dollars to unauthorized 
immigrants of using smuggling services. Unauthorized immigrants are 
Figure 5.3  Average Number of Border Crossings per Migrant, by 
Documentation Status and Use of Smuggling Services
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a group that carries special interest given their potentially higher likeli-
hood of remitting larger proportions of their earnings back home. Only 
62 percent of illegal border crossers using smugglers report on the cost 
incurred from using their services. On average, these unauthorized im-
migrants report paying $427 for each crossing. This cost was as low 
as $303 during the 1990s and increased to an average of $633 from 
2000 onwards. Table 5.1A also shows how immigrants’ use of smug-
gling services is inversely related to the cost of such services, thus sug-
gesting the existence of a downward sloping demand for smuggling 
services on the part of unauthorized immigrants. Table 5.1B reveals 
large variation by country in smuggling costs. Mexican immigrants, 
at an average cost per trip of about $370, pay the least for smuggling 
services, which is to be expected because of the geographic proximity 
of Mexico to the United States. In contrast, Costa Rica, the most dis-
tant country from the United States in the sample under consideration, 
has the highest average amount paid by its emigrants for smuggling 
services (about $2,100). The average price paid by Nicaraguans is ap-
proximately $1,700, whereas Dominicans pay about $1,000. Given the 
limited number of observations available for some of these countries, 
it is difficult to clearly identify trends. However, if we focus on those 
countries for which there are a larger number of observations—Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica—it appears as if smuggling costs have been 
N Mean Std. dev.
Average cost 2,034 426.74 584.62
Average cost by decade  
of last U.S. visit
During 1990s 1,273 303.25 408.88
2000 and later 761 633.33 752.45
Average cost by number  
of successful crossings
None 11 815.23 1,417.40
One 1,050 462.53 662.59
Two 498 393.57 489.86
Three 266 362.03 423.58
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
Table 5.1A  Average Cost of Smuggling Services and Its Relationship to 
Successful Crossings, All Countries ($)
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Variable
Costa Rica Dominican Republic Haiti Nicaragua Mexico
N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev.
Average cost 32 2,101.56 1,223.72 13 1,035.58 977.21 2 4,000.00 2,828.43 36 1,670.60 1,298.21 1,961 368.60 445.54
Average cost by decade of last U.S. visit
During 1990s 11 1,022.73 611.30 7 1,090.29 1,322.55 1 6,000.00 — 27 1,401.54 981.53 1,227 263.50 280.38
2000 and later 21 2,666.67 1,076.49 6 971.75 527.80 1 2,000.00 — 9 2,477.78 1,806.95 724 546.73 592.92
Average cost of smuggling services by number of successful crossings
None 0 — — 1 1,130.00 — 0 — — 0 — — 10 783.75 1,490.01
One 24 1,981.25 1,172.22 11 962.05 1,065.57 2 4,000.00 2,828.43 29 1,279.02 1,327.38 984 375.38 476.43
Two 6 2,158.33 1,473.32 1 1,750.00 — — — — 7 1,428.57 1,234.52 484 353.92 381.79
Three 1 3,000.00 — — — — — — — — — — 265 352.08 391.97
NOTE: — = not available.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
Pozo B
ook.indb   80
4/18/2007   10:03:16 A
M
Remittance Patterns of Latin American Immigrants in the United States   81
on the rise since the 1990s. In the cases of Mexico and Costa Rica, 
these costs have more than doubled. The increasing cost of smuggling 
services may have heightened the need on the part of immigrants to re-
mit money home, both to pay their debt and to finance the migration of 
additional household members to the United States. It is interesting to 
note how the downward-sloping demand for smuggling services on the 
part of unauthorized immigrants suggested by Table 5.1A is supported 
by the Mexican data in Table 5.1B. However, in the case of Costa Ri-
cans or Nicaraguans, a larger number of successful illegal border cross-
ings is directly linked to a higher cost for smuggling services. As such, 
these migrants may be “getting what they paid for.”  
IMMIgRANTS’ REMITTINg PATTERNS: HoW MUCH IS 
SENT? BY WHoM? FoR WHAT PURPoSES? 
How Much?
Perhaps the most basic yet difficult task of remittance researchers 
has been to measure these money flows and the percentage of immi-
grants sending money back home. Table 5.2 provides a comparison 
of such figures across the countries being examined. More than 5,700 
immigrants, or about 89 percent of immigrants in the sample, provide 
information regarding their remitting practices. Approximately 70 per-
cent of those 5,703 immigrants report that they sent money back home 
on a monthly basis during their last U.S. trip. This figure is in line with 
the more than 60 percent of immigrants from Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Haiti that remit money home. In 
contrast, only 46 percent of the 52 Peruvian immigrants in the sample 
sent money home to their families on a monthly basis. 
Table 5.2 also lists the average dollar amounts remitted home by 
immigrants from these Latin American and Caribbean nations. These 
average $300 a month, or 40 percent of immigrants’ income. Money 
transfers are smallest among immigrants from the Dominican Republic 
($179 a month) and largest among immigrants from Costa Rica ($493). 
In line with this, Dominicans remit approximately 16 percent of their 
monthly earnings, whereas Costa Ricans remit about 55 percent. How-
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SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
Table 5.2  Remittance Patterns for Surveyed Latin American Countries




As a share of 
income
All countries
Mean 0.71 301.68 0.40
Std. dev. 0.46 418.48 0.98
N 5,703 4,034 3,270
Costa Rica
Mean 0.69 492.91 0.55
Std. dev. 0.46 865.46 1.00
N 167 115 78
Dominican Republic
Mean 0.67 179.18 0.16
Std. dev. 0.47 195.31 0.21
N 154 103 84
Haiti
Mean 0.74 284.56 0.13
Std. dev. 0.45 251.78 0.06
N 19 14 7
Nicaragua
Mean 0.61 223.18 0.22
Std. dev. 0.49 255.03 0.35
N 132 80 61
Peru
Mean 0.46 376.55 0.16
Std. dev. 0.50 371.75 0.14
N 52 24 12
Mexico
Mean 0.71 300.43 0.41
Std. dev. 0.45 403.35 1.00
N 5,179 3,698 3,028
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ever, there is not always a direct relationship between the dollar amount 
remitted and the percentage of monthly earnings remitted home. For in-
stance, while the average dollar amount remitted by Peruvians is above 
the mean for the group of countries being examined, the percentage of 
income remitted by Peruvians is far below—they remit only 16 percent 
of their monthly earnings, compared to 41 percent for the other nation-
alities in the sample.    
By Whom?
In addition to measuring remittance transfers, the literature has long 
examined immigrants’ remitting motives. Overall, a variety of reasons 
for sending money back home has been identified, including altruism, 
exchange, investment, and coinsurance. The altruism motive suggests 
that remittance payments made by migrants to their families increase 
with the needs of household members back home (Becker 1974). The 
exchange motive, or at least the most predominant one, comes from 
existing evidence of immigrants repaying family members and friends 
back home for financing their trip (Cox 1987). Another motive, invest-
ment, occurs when immigrants remit money back home to purchase 
assets with the intent of earning an economic return. And Lucas and 
Stark (1985) call attention to yet another motive for sending money 
back home—coinsurance, by which both immigrants and family mem-
bers or friends provide monetary and in-kind transfers to insure each 
other against economic shocks. 
For What Purposes?
The MMP93 and LAMP ask remitters their purpose in sending mon-
ey back home. Remitters are allowed to choose up to five motives for 
transferring money home. For practical purposes, these motives can be 
grouped into either “consumption” or “asset accumulation/investment,” 
depending on whether remittances are sent by immigrants to cover the 
consumption needs of family and friends back home or to be invested in 
productive activities. Whether a particular expenditure category should 
constitute consumption or asset accumulation is debatable, particularly 
when it comes to assets such as housing. However, for the purposes of 
this study, I group the following motives under the category of asset ac-
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cumulation: construction or repair of house, purchase of a house or lot, 
purchase of tools, purchase of livestock, purchase of agricultural inputs, 
start-up or expansion of a business, educational expenses, health ex-
penses, and savings. In contrast, consumption comprises the following 
expenditures: food and maintenance, purchase of a vehicle, purchase 
of consumer goods, financing a special event, recreation/entertainment 
expenses, and debt payments. Figure 5.4 addresses migrants’ remitting 
motives. Because migrants can indicate up to five motives for remit-
ting money back home, the percentages of migrants sending money for 
consumption and asset accumulation purposes do not add up to 100. 
According to Figure 5.4, consumption is the overwhelming purpose be-
hind immigrants’ remitting practices, yet a nontrivial portion of remit-



















NOTE: Percentages do not add up to 100 because more than one purpose may be re-
ported.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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Consumption appears to be a more pressing remittance motive for im-
migrants coming from the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Peru, Nicaragua, 
and Costa Rica than it does for those from Mexico: only a small fraction 
of immigrants from those economies (never more than 18 percent of 
remitters) indicate sending money back home for asset accumulation 
purposes. 
Several empirical studies have noted that remittances differ accord-
ing to immigrants’ age, family responsibilities back home, earnings, 
and whether they have temporary or permanent status (de la Garza and 
Lowell 2002; Taylor 1999). In addition to these characteristics, Tables 
5.3 through 5.6 examine the variability of immigrants’ remitting pat-
terns and purposes according to whether or not the immigrants were 
authorized upon entry, their educational attainment, decade of visit, and 
area of residence while in the United States. Several findings are worth 
discussing. The data in Table 5.3 confirm what was hypothesized earlier 
in the chapter: that a higher percentage of unauthorized immigrants (75 
percent) remit money back home than legal migrants do (64 percent). 
Yet the data in Table 5.4 indicate that there is not much difference in 
the percentage of earnings that these two groups of immigrants remit 
home. 
Likewise, less educated immigrants appear more likely to remit than 
their more educated counterparts (59 percent compared to 50 percent 
in Table 5.3). There are no statistically significant differences among 
countries in how likely less educated immigrants are to remit relative to 
more educated immigrants. Nor do less educated immigrants seem to 
send a significantly higher proportion of their incomes home than more 
educated immigrants (20 versus 17 percent, Table 5.4). 
Other interesting results refer to remittance trends. According to the 
data in Table 5.3, a higher percentage of Latin American immigrants 
have transferred money to their families during the present decade than 
in the 1990s. This is the case for Costa Ricans, Dominicans, Nicara-
guans, Peruvians, and Mexicans; the exception is Haitians. However, 
the limited number of observations for Haiti casts doubt on any con-
clusions. Furthermore, Table 5.4 indicates that, as a percentage of mi-
grants’ monthly earnings, remittance transfers have also been on the 
rise among Dominicans and Peruvians during the current decade.
A final aspect revealed by Tables 5.3 and 5.4 involves changes in 
remitting patterns according to whether immigrants resided in a large 
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86Table 5.3  Percentage of Migrants Remitting, by Documentation Status, Education, Decade, and City Dweller
Variable
All countries Costa Rica
Dominican 
Republic Haiti Nicaragua Perua Mexico
% t-stat. % 		t-stat. % 		t-stat. % t-stat. % t-stat. % 		t-stat. % 		t-stat.
By documentation status
Legal 0.64 — 0.66 — 0.68 — 0.69 — 0.57 — 0.44 — 0.66 —
Unauthorized 0.75 −8.36*** 0.80 −1.76* 0.57 0.75 1.00 −2.61** 0.80 −2.22** 1.00 −7.90*** 0.75 −7.34***
By educational attainment
Up to 15 years 0.59 — 0.60 — 0.69 — 0.75 — 0.56 — 0.56 — 0.58 —
16+ years 0.50 2.37** 0.33 1.48 0.73 −0.35 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.29 0.37 1.29 0.50 1.44
By decade of visit
During 1990s 0.67 — 0.45 — 0.58 — 0.92 — 0.56 — 0.22 — 0.68 —
2000 and later 0.79 −9.79*** 0.81 −4.76*** 0.83 −3.39*** 0.33 2.63** 0.67 −1.28 0.64 −3.42*** 0.79 −8.92***
By area where they stayed in the U.S.
Not a large city 0.73 — 0.68 — 0.54 — 0.70 — 0.56 — — — 0.75 —
Large city 0.67 5.42*** 0.78 −0.86 0.73 −2.28** 0.78 −0.37 0.73 −1.82* — — 0.66 6.56***
NOTE: — = not available. *significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level 
(two-tailed test). The hypothesis being tested is Ha: diff ≠ 0. 
a Information on migrant residency while in the United States is not available in the Peruvian survey.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.   
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Table 5.4  Percentage of Income Remitted Home, by Documentation Status, Education, Decade, and City Dweller
Variable
All countries Costa Rica
Dominican 
Republic Haitia Nicaragua Perub Mexico
% 		t-stat. % t-stat. % t-stat. % t-stat. % t-stat. % t-stat. % t-stat.
By documentation status
Legal 0.39 — 0.41 — 0.16 — — — 0.21  — 0.15 — 0.42 —
Unauthorized 0.41 −0.44 0.96 −1.34 0.17 −0.12 — — 0.31 −0.65 0.22 — 0.41 0.40
By educational attainment
Up to 15 years 0.20 — 0.14 — 0.13 — — — 0.10  — 0.19 — 0.23 —
16+ years 0.17 0.87 0.09 0.82 0.11 0.39 — — 0.24 −1.41 0.06 1.75 0.18 1.07
By decade of visit
During 1990s 0.30 — 0.28 — 0.09 — — — 0.14  — 0.03 — 0.31 —
2000 and later 0.28 0.83 0.46 −1.06 0.18 −2.02** — — 0.16 −0.36 0.13 −1.97* 0.28 1.34
By area where they stayed in the U.S.
Not a large city 0.44 — 0.61 — 0.22 — 0.19 — 0.25  — — — 0.44 —
Large city 0.34 2.91*** 0.22 1.28 0.14 1.29 0.11 1.75 0.17 0.83 — — 0.36 2.34**
NOTE: — = not available. *significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level 
(two-tailed test). The hypothesis being tested is Ha: diff ≠ 0. 
a The limited number of observations for Haiti impedes a meaningful testing of statistically significant differences in most cases.
b Information on migrant residency while in the United States is not available in the Peruvian survey. 
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP. 
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city while in the United States. Immigrants were more likely to remit 
(73 percent versus 67 percent, Table 5.3) and to remit a larger fraction 
of their monthly incomes (44 percent versus 34 percent, Table 5.4) if 
they resided in smaller cities or rural areas. When distinguishing by 
immigrants’ country of origin, the same pattern is observed, partially 
as a result of the Mexican data being representative, to a large extent, 
of agricultural migrant workers. However, the percentage of migrants 
likely to remit in every country but Mexico (save Peru, where data are 
unavailable) is larger among those who last resided in a large U.S. city. 
This pattern may simply be indicative of the location preferences of 
some of these countries’ emigrants: Dominicans may concentrate in 
New York City, for example. 
Whereas Tables 5.3 and 5.4 cover the percentage of remitters and 
the magnitude of their remittance transfers by status, education, decade, 
and rurality, Tables 5.5 and 5.6 display how the same characteristics 
affect the purpose of funds remitted by immigrants. Perhaps the most 
noticeable result from Table 5.5 is that remitting for consumption pur-
poses is not only more prominent among less educated immigrants than 
among more educated ones (43 versus 35 percent) but, in addition, it 
has become the predominant remitting motive among immigrants over 
the present decade (62 percent) as compared to the 1990s (43 percent). 
This overall trend holds true among immigrants from Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Peru, and Mexico, but not among those from 
Haiti and Nicaragua. Correspondingly, the data in Table 5.6 reveal how 
asset accumulation has lost importance over time in the overall sample. 
As a whole, asset accumulation appears to be a more prominent motive 
among legal immigrants than among unauthorized ones. Likewise, less 
educated Costa Ricans and Peruvians seem to cite asset accumulation as 
a reason for remitting money home on more occasions than their more 
educated counterparts. Finally, investment is more commonly a purpose 
for transferring funds by immigrants residing in large U.S. cities during 
their last trip, as is borne out by Costa Ricans and Mexicans.    
In the following section, I take a look at households’ reporting of 
these money inflows. I pay particular attention to the significance of 
remittances in the family budget as well as to how households make use 
of these money transfers.   
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Table 5.5  Percentage of Migrants Declaring Consumption as the Purpose for Remitting Money Home, by 
Documentation Status, Education, Decade, and City Dweller
Variable
All countries Costa Rica
Dominican 
Republic Haiti Nicaragua Perua Mexico
% t-stat. % 			t-stat. % 		t-stat. % t-stat. % 			t-stat. % 			t-stat. % t-stat.
By documentation status
Legal 0.78 — 0.84 — 0.89 — 0.82  — 0.84 — 0.73 — 0.77 —
Unauthorized 0.79 −0.78 0.86 −0.23 1.00 −3.33*** 1.00 −1.49 0.88 −0.32 1.00 −2.81*** 0.79 −1.49
By educational attainment
Up to 15 years 0.43 — 0.39 — 0.57 — 0.35  — 0.42 — 0.32 — 0.42 —
16+ years 0.35 2.20** 0.33 0.32 0.64 −0.54 0.20 0.66 0.41 0.16 0.30 0.16 0.32 2.28***
By decade of visit
During 1990s 0.43 — 0.20 — 0.34 — 0.12  — 0.27 — 0.06 — 0.46 —
2000 and later 0.62 −14.27*** 0.65 −7.86*** 0.72 −5.44*** 0.09 0.37 0.06 −2.88*** 0.48 −4.68*** 0.63 −11.81***
By area where they stayed in the U.S.
Not a large city 0.79 — 0.89 — 1.00 — 0.71  — 0.83 — — — 0.78 —
Large city 0.79 −0.02 0.50 4.00*** 0.87 1.95** 1.00 −1.55 0.89 −0.69 — — 0.79 −0.27
NOTE: — = not available. *significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level 
(two-tailed test). The hypothesis being tested is Ha: diff ≠ 0.
a Information on migrant residency while in the United States is not available in the Peruvian survey. 
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.  
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90Table 5.6  Percentage of Migrants Declaring Asset Accumulation as the Purpose for Remitting Money Home, by 
Documentation Status, Education, Decade, and City Dweller
Variable
All countries Costa Rica
Dominican 
Republic Haiti Nicaragua Perua Mexico
% 		t-stat. % 		t-stat. % 			t-stat. % t-stat. % t-stat. % 			t-stat. % 		t-stat.
By documentation status
Legal 0.47 — 0.17 — 0.07 — 0.09 — 0.19 — 0.18 — 0.49 —
Unauthorized 0.43 2.12 0.11 0.91 0.00 2.73*** 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.63 0.00 2.16** 0.48 0.94
By educational attainment
Up to 15 years 0.19 — 0.15 — 0.09 — 0.09 — 0.11 — 0.11 — 0.23 —
16+ years 0.13 2.40** 0.00 3.23*** 0.00 2.54*** 0.00 1.45 0.05 1.02 0.05 0.76 0.21 0.63
By decade of visit
During 1990s 0.29 — 0.05 — 0.03 — 0.01 — 0.06 — 0.02 — 0.33 —
2000 and later 0.24 4.44*** 0.11 −1.66* 0.04 −0.16 0.00 1.00 0.04 −0.36 0.06 −0.85 0.27 4.29***
By area where they stayed in the U.S.
Not a large city 0.43 — 0.11 — 0.00 — 0.14 — 0.15 — — — 0.45 —
Large city 0.50 −4.62*** 0.50 −4.00*** 0.09 −1.60 0.00 1.00 0.22 −0.79 — — 0.53 −4.58***
NOTE: — = not available. *significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***significant at the 0.01 level 
(two-tailed test). The hypothesis being tested is Ha: diff ≠ 0. 
a Information on migrant residency while in the United States is not available in the Peruvian survey.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.  
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HoUSEHoLD REMITTANCE RECEIPT AND ACTUAL USAgE 
In addition to measuring remittance transfers and examining the 
motives behind immigrants’ remitting patterns, the literature has long 
discussed how these money flows are used by migrants’ families back 
home. This is of interest because immigrants’ purposes for transfer-
ring money may not always coincide with the reported use of funds 
by the receiving families. In this regard, the MMP93 and LAMP ask 
households whether they receive any money transfers from abroad and 
whether these transfers represent a small, medium, or large portion of 
family income. Additionally, households are questioned about whether 
they use the reported funds for consumption or for asset accumulation 
purposes. Summary data of these findings are displayed in Figure 5.5 
and Table 5.7. 
Approximately 2 percent of the 21,263 households interviewed 
by the MMP93 and LAMP report receiving remittance transfers from 
abroad.6 Table 5.7 displays slightly larger percentages of remittance-
receiving households in Haiti (8 percent), the Dominican Republic (5 
percent), and Costa Rica and Peru (both 3 percent) than in Nicaragua 
and Mexico (2 percent). Overall, 47 percent of the households report-
ing on the magnitude of remittance income declare that these funds 
constitute a large portion of household income (not shown). Separately, 
the various countries report similar percentages. The exception is Hai-
tian households, most of whom declare these funds to be of medium 
size. Thus, dependence on remittance income may be a reality for some 
families in these Latin American and Caribbean nations.     
Does the ultimate usage of remittance income by families coincide 
with the purpose for which immigrants transfer funds home? Figure 
5.5 and the bottom category of Table 5.7 address the question of what 
remittances are used for. Thirty-eight percent of remittance-receiving 
households say they use remittance income for purchasing or adding 
to existing property (Figure 5.5). This percentage mirrors the 38 per-
cent of immigrants declaring property investment as one of the motives 
for sending money back to their native country.7 A comparable figure 
on the percentage of immigrants sending money back for consumption 
is, unfortunately, not available since households are only asked about 
the use of remittance income to purchase specific items, and only one 
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of those items falls within the consumption category—vehicles, at 29 
percent (Figure 5.5). 
Large percentages of remittance-receiving households (Table 5.7) 
declare using this income for asset accumulation purposes in Haiti (83 
percent), Costa Rica (49 percent), the Dominican Republic (41 percent), 
and Mexico (39 percent). Yet only in the case of Mexico is the percent-
age of receiving households declaring that they use remittances for as-
set accumulation approached by the percentage of immigrants declar-
ing asset accumulation as one of the motives for sending money home, 
as shown in Figure 5.4. In the other cases, households appear to be 
using remittances to invest significantly more than is expected of them 
by their remitting family members. Only 16 percent of Costa Rican 
emigrants, 7 percent of Dominicans, and 7 percent of Haitians said they 
Figure 5.5  Types of Investment by Remittance-Receiving Households (%)
Vehicles (29)
Property (38) 




NOTE: Only 78 percent of households reported using remittances to purchase assets. 
The remaining 22 percent (“None”) use remittances for consumption purposes.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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Republic Haiti Nicaragua Peru Mexico
N % N % N % N % N % N %
% remittance-receiving 
households 
39 0.03 51 0.05 30 0.08 40 0.02 19 0.03 264 0.02
% of households declaring remittances to be a small, medium, or large part of their income 
Small 36 0.28 51 0.27 30 0.13 39 0.28 19 0.26 264 0.40
Medium 36 0.19 51 0.22 30 0.60 39 0.21 19 0.16 264 0.13
Large 36 0.53 51 0.51 30 0.27 39 0.51 19 0.58 264 0.47
% of households declaring that they use remittances to finance consumption or asset accumulation
Consumption (vehicles)a 39 0.26 51 0.33 30 0.53 40 0.15 19 0.26 264 0.28
Asset accumulation 39 0.49 51 0.41 30 0.83 40 0.13 19 0.32 264 0.39
Housing investments 39 0.41 51 0.37 30 0.80 40 0.13 19 0.32 264 0.37
Business 39 0.00 51 0.12 30 0.00 40 0.00 19 0.00 264 0.00
Land 39 0.10 51 0.00 30 0.00 40 0.03 19 0.00 264 0.04
Farm 39 0.13 51 0.02 30 0.00 40 0.03 19 0.00 264 0.03
Livestock 39 0.05 51 0.02 30 0.03 40 0.03 19 0.00 264 0.05
a The only specific form of consumption the survey asks about is the purchase of vehicles.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations using the MMP93 and the LAMP.
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sent money home for asset accumulation purposes. This pattern is also 
observed among Peruvian households: 32 percent of remittance-receiv-
ing households in Peru use the remittances to purchase assets, whereas 
only 17 percent of Peruvian remitters report sending money home for 
asset accumulation purposes. In fact, only in Mexico and Nicaragua do 
households engage in less asset accumulation than is expected from 
remitters. In particular, 39 and 13 percent of Mexican and Nicaraguan 
remittance-receiving households report using remittance income to 
purchase assets, whereas 48 percent and 18 percent of Mexican and 
Nicaraguan remitters indicate investment as one of the purposes for 
transferring money home. 
It is interesting to see how these funds are invested by country. In 
Costa Rica, as in most countries, remittance income is most often used 
to purchase housing investments (41 percent of remittance-receiving 
households indicate this usage). Thirteen and 10 percent of remittance-
receiving Costa Rican households indicate farms and land, respectively, 
as secondary assets acquired with remittance income. In the Dominican 
Republic, the primary use of remittance income is also for housing stock 
acquisition (37 percent); however, for Dominicans business investments 
are the second use for the transferred funds (12 percent of households). 
In summary, the report from families does not support the notion that 
remittances do not serve investment purposes. Rather, it shows that a 
substantial percentage of households use the received money flows for 
asset accumulation purposes. 
CoNCLUSIoN
This study explores the similarities and differences in migration and 
remitting patterns of Latin Americans in the United States using data 
from two comparable survey instruments, the Mexican Migration Proj-
ect (MMP93) and the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP). 
The data reveal that 68 percent of Latin American immigrants in 
the sample—coming from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, Peru, and Mexico—are unauthorized. About 75 percent of 
these unauthorized immigrants rely on smuggling services to cross the 
border, paying $427 on average. While immigrants’ reliance on smug-
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glers and the money paid for such services vary across countries (de-
pending, in part, on the country’s proximity to the United States), smug-
gling costs have generally been on the rise for the past two decades. 
As such, it is not surprising to find that immigrants who use cheaper 
smuggling services cross the U.S. border more often than their counter-
parts who pay higher prices. Yet in some instances, such as with Costa 
Ricans and Nicaraguans, higher smuggling costs seem to be justified by 
a higher ratio of successful illegal border crossings. 
About 70 percent of immigrants report that they remitted money 
back home on a monthly basis during their last U.S. trip. On average, 
migrants remitted $300 a month, or 40 percent of their earnings. These 
figures vary significantly across countries, with Dominicans sending 
an average of $179 a month, or 16 percent of their earnings, and Costa 
Ricans sending as much as $493 a month, or 55 percent of their earn-
ings. When we examine immigrants’ remitting motives, the data show 
that consumption is the most important motive for sending money home 
in the case of 79 percent of remitters. Consumption as the reason for re-
mittance takes on greater importance for less educated immigrants or 
those who came to the United States in 2000 or later. However, a con-
siderable proportion of immigrants (45 percent) report asset accumula-
tion as one of their motives for transferring money to their families. 
Among Dominican, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Costa Rican remitters, 
however, the importance of asset accumulation is significantly smaller, 
never surpassing 18 percent. 
Examining households’ remittance-receiving patterns and their us-
age of these money transfers, we see that about 45 percent of the 439 
remittance-receiving households in the survey (2 percent of all house-
holds in the survey) report using these money transfers to purchase as-
sets. As such, households appear to be investing remittances at a higher 
rate than is expected of them by their remitting family members. Most 
of the flows used for asset accumulation go toward acquiring property. 
Secondarily, 10 and 13 percent of remittance-receiving households in 
Costa Rica invest in land and farming, and 12 percent of such house-
holds in the Dominican Republic invest in business. In most instances, 
remittances constitute a significant portion of household income, mean-
ing that these families rely to some extent on these flows.      
The analysis reveals the different migration and remitting practices 
of Latin American emigrants as well as the diverse uses of remittance 
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income by households, depending on the country. Given the mobility of 
workers and capital flows in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is im-
portant to gain a better understanding of these country-level differences 
and exploit them in the design of policies that maximize the economic 
potential of money flows in improving the livelihood of their recipients 
back home. 
Notes
  1. The Mexican Migration Project (MMP93) and the Latin American Migration 
Project (LAMP) are collaborative research projects based at Princeton Universi-
ty and the University of Guadalajara, supported by the National Institute of Child 
Health and Human Development (NICHD), Rockville, MD. The Web sites for 
MMP93 and LAMP can be found at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu and http://lamp 
.opr.princeton.edu.
   The LAMP has also conducted research in Puerto Rico, Guatemala, and Para-
guay. However, Guatemala and Paraguay were not included here because either 
the data sets were too small or (in the case of Paraguay) a modified version of the 
survey was used. Puerto Rico was omitted because of its link to the United States 
(whereby its migrants are all legal).
 2. The MMP93 sample covers communities in the states of Aguascalientes, Baja 
California Norte, Chihuahua, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, 
Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, 
Sinaloa, and Zacatecas.
 3. The MMP93 interviews were conducted in communities of various size, eth-
nic composition, and economic development in typical source regions for U.S.-
bound migrants. The sample has expanded over time to incorporate communities 
in newer sending states.
 4. This figure of 6,392 includes the 5,837 immigrants from the MMP93 study, men-
tioned above, plus 555 immigrants from the LAMP.
 5. These averages are for all countries in the study and are not represented in Figure 
5.3.
  6. This percentage, undoubtedly driven by the prominence of Mexican data in our 
joint sample, is close to the 5 percent of Mexican households who report receiv-
ing remittance transfers from abroad in the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y 
Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH). The ENIGH is a representative Mexican house-
hold survey of income and expenditures carried out by the INEGI—the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia, e Informática, or the Mexican National 
Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
2005).
 7. The 38 percent figure represents the aggregation of the country-level averages 
shown in Figure 5.4.  
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Small island states have among the highest rates of migration in 
the world (Table 6.1).1 The average island country with a population 
of under 1.5 million has 17 percent of all its citizens living overseas, 
and several of these island nations have more than 30 percent of their 
citizens abroad. Many of the Pacific Islands follow this pattern; for in-
stance, approximately one-third of Samoa’s and Tonga’s populations 
live in another country. Some of the smallest islands in the Pacific have 
even more dramatic migration rates: more individuals born in Niue and 
Tokelau now live in New Zealand than on either of these two islands.2 
Together with high migration rates one finds heavy dependence on re-
mittances in many of these countries.3 For the year 2004, Tonga, the 
main subject of this chapter, had remittances equal to 39 percent of 
GDP, the highest measured rate in the world.
The growing size of remittances around the world has led research-
ers to give renewed attention to their importance for development and 
has prompted officials to engage in discussion of policies designed to 
increase the benefits of migration (Global Commission on International 
Migration 2005; World Bank 2005). One question that can arise in these 
discussions is whether there is scope for countries such as Tonga, which 
already receives large remittance flows, to further increase the benefits 
from remittances. This chapter will use a recently conducted survey of 
Tongan migrants in New Zealand, and of Tongans in Tonga, to argue 
that there is still a sizable scope for policies designed to lower the costs 
of sending money and improve the knowledge of migrants and their 
families about remittance products.
The survey I use here collects much more detailed information on 
remittance transactions than is commonly the case. I use this informa-
tion to provide a description of some aspects of remittances that are 
typically missed in standard surveys; these additional aspects have im-
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Cape Verde 470 18.7 11.5 Portugal
Comoros 600 3.2 3.8 France
Mauritius 1,222 6.9 4.0 France
Sao Tome and Principe 157 8.5 1.7 Portugal
Seychelles 84 8.7 0.3 United Kingdom
Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda 79 28.9 1.5 United States
Dominica 71 32.0 1.6 United States
Grenada 195 23.8 5.3 United States
St. Kitts and Nevis 47 38.5 1.1 United States
St. Lucia 161 17.5 0.6 United States
St. Vincent and Grenadines 109 31.1 0.8 United States
Trinidad and Tobago 1,313 18.8 0.8 United States
Pacific Islands
Fiji 835 13.5 1.1 Australia
Kiribati 96 2.4 12.0 United States
Marshall Islands 53 13.0 — United States
Micronesia, Federated 
States of
125 12.2 — United States
Palau 20 20.2 — United States
Samoa 178 35.1 14.2 New Zealand
Solomon Islands 457 0.5 0.9 Australia
Tonga 102 31.1 39.2 New Zealand
Vanuatu 210 1.0 3.3 Australia
South Asia
Maldives 293 0.8 0.4 India
NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Remittances and population from World Development Indicators central 
database (August 2005 update); migration stocks and destinations from foreign-born 
Version 4 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database in Parsons et al. 
(2005).
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plications for the measurement of remittances. The survey also matches 
a small sample of migrants in New Zealand to their family members re-
maining in Tonga, and both groups are interviewed. I conclude by using 
this matched sample to look at how expectations for the continuation of 
remittances differ between migrants and their families.
A BRIEF HISToRY oF ToNgAN MIgRATIoN To  
NEW ZEALAND
The Kingdom of Tonga is an archipelago of islands in the South 
Pacific, about two-thirds of the way from Hawaii to New Zealand.4 
The population is just over 100,000, and more than 30,000 additional 
Tongans live abroad (Table 6.1). Tongan migration to New Zealand re-
ally began in the 1960s and 1970s, when Tongans began arriving on 
temporary permits to take up work opportunities. After their permits 
expired, some returned to Tonga and others stayed on in New Zealand 
illegally. An amnesty in 1976 granted many of these illegals permanent 
residence.
Migration for work continued in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, 
and by 1986 the Tongan population in New Zealand had reached 13,600. 
In 1991 New Zealand introduced a points-based selection system for 
immigration, in which potential migrants are awarded points for edu-
cation, skills, and business capital. Few Tongans qualified to migrate 
under this points system, so most Tongan migration during the 1990s 
was under family-sponsored categories—as the spouse, parent, or child 
of an existing migrant. For example, in fiscal year 1998, only 29 Ton-
gans were admitted as principal applicants under the points system, 
compared to 436 under family categories. With family migration, the 
Tongan-born population in New Zealand had grown to 19,000 by the 
2001 census.
In early 2002 another channel was opened up for immigration to 
New Zealand, through the creation of the Pacific Access Category 
(PAC), which allows for a quota of 250 Tongans to emigrate to New 
Zealand each year. Applicants in this category must be between the ages 
of 18 and 45, meet requirements for health, character, and a minimum 
level of English-speaking ability, and have an offer of employment in 
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New Zealand. It is the group of new migrants in this category that I 
shall discuss.
DATA
The main source of data I use is the Tongan component of the 
Pacific Island–New Zealand Migration Survey (PINZMS), conducted 
in the first half of 2005. The PINZMS uses a sample frame of applicants 
in the Pacific Access Category. More individuals apply to migrate than 
the quota allows, so a lottery is used to allocate visas among applicants. 
A comparison of winners and losers in this lottery is a feature of other 
works that use this survey to estimate the causal effect of migration 
on a number of migration outcomes (McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman 
2006; Stillman, McKenzie, and Gibson 2006). In addition to sampling 
migrants in New Zealand who come through the PAC, the survey in-
cludes a sample of applicants for the quota who remain in Tonga, a 
sample of nonapplicants who live in the same villages as the applicants, 
and a sample of remaining household members of the migrants in New 
Zealand. The first round provides a sample of 65 migrant households 
in New Zealand and 230 households in Tonga. Forty-five out of the 65 
migrants in New Zealand left behind household members in Tonga, and 
we were able to survey 28 of these remaining households. 
The PINZMS is a multitopic, detailed survey designed to look at 
many aspects of the migration process. Detailed modules on remittanc-
es are given to migrant households in New Zealand and to all house-
holds in Tonga. The survey collects information on remittances sent and 
received by both groups, separates these into money and goods flows, 
collects information on the channels used to send remittances, and asks 
a number of questions about knowledge of remittance methods and ex-
pectations of future remittance patterns.5
I supplement the PINZMS survey with information on the cost of 
sending remittances, gathered directly from remittance service provid-
ers. For this chapter, for comparison purposes, I have additionally col-
lected information on the costs of sending from Australia to several 
Pacific Island countries, and from the United States to a couple of small 
Caribbean countries.6
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THE HIgH CoST oF REMITTINg IN THE PACIFIC
There are two main financial costs involved in sending money 
across borders.7 The first is the fee charged by the remittance-sending 
company, which is usually fixed or a step function. For example, ANZ 
and Westpac banks in New Zealand charge a fixed fee of NZ$25 to 
send a telegraphic transfer (wire transfer) from a bank account in New 
Zealand to a bank account in Tonga. Western Union charges a fixed fee 
of NZ$20 in New Zealand to send to Tonga or Samoa, but it charges a 
stepped fee in Australia: A$15 for amounts of A$75 or less, A$20 for 
amounts of A$76–$300, and A$25 for amounts of A$301–$999.
This component of the cost is the one most easily seen by consum-
ers. However, the second component of the cost is less transparent. In 
addition to the fixed fee, remittance-sending companies typically make 
money by offering migrants a less advantageous exchange rate than the 
interbank rate. The exchange rate commission charged by the bank or 
remittance-sending company can be calculated by the equation
 
(6.1)   R =
  100 × (Interbank	Rate	−	Offered	Rate)  
.
  
             Interbank	Rate
For example, at the interbank rate,8 NZ$100 would buy 138.71 
pa’anga. However, at the exchange rate offered by ANZ Bank, one 
would instead receive 135.79 pa’anga (and also have to pay the fixed 
fee). The exchange rate commission of 2.1 percent therefore represents 
a loss of pa’anga compared to what one would receive at the interbank 
rate. Figure 6.1 graphs the exchange rate commission from New Zea-
land and Australia to a number of different Pacific Island countries for 
ANZ Bank telegraphic transfers and Western Union transactions. For 
comparison purposes I also show rates from Australia to the United 
States and New Zealand, and the Western Union rate from the United 
States to Mexico, one of the world’s most competitive markets.
The figure shows a wide range of exchange rate commissions, from 
just over 1 percent to nearly 12. The highest commission is charged by 
Melie mei Langi, a church-run remittance channel for sending money 
from New Zealand to Tonga. This channel charges an extremely low 
fixed fee (NZ$5), which is attractive to those who send small amounts, 
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even though they must pay a high exchange rate commission. More-
over, even between ANZ Bank and Western Union, it is not the case that 
one company always offers the better rate: Western Union has a lower 
rate to Samoa but higher rates to Tonga, for example. 
Figure 6.2 plots the overall cost of remitting from New Zealand to 
Tonga by different channels, expressing the cost as a percentage of the 
amount remitted. The cheapest method by far is to use an ATM card: 
migrants in New Zealand can give their relative a second card, which 
can then be used to withdraw cash from the ATM for a fee of NZ$5–$8 
for most banks. The other methods all have much higher fixed fees, 
resulting in extremely high costs for remitting small amounts. For ex-
ample, remitting NZ$100 (US$68) ends up costing 25–30 percent of the 
amount remitted.
These high levels of costs are not atypical in the Pacific and are 
higher than in many other regions of the world. Figure 6.3 shows that 
the cost of sending from New Zealand to Tonga is very similar to that 



































































































Figure 6.1  Exchange R te Commission on Remittances
NOTE: ANZ = ANZ Bank Telegraphic Transfer rate; WU = Western Union rate; 
 AUS = Australia; NZ = New Zealand; US = United States.
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of sending from Australia to other Pacific Island countries, and is higher 
than sending from the United States to Mexico, and from the United 
States to Grenada, another small island country. In Gibson, McKenzie, 
and Rohorua (2006), we compare the cost of sending US$200 (NZ$294) 
by way of different remittance channels around the world. The cost of 
15–23 percent from New Zealand to Tonga is approximately twice the 
average cost of sending from France, Germany, the United States or the 
United Kingdom to a wide variety of destinations, including Pakistan, 
Mozambique, Portugal, Greece, and the Philippines. This is not simply 
a result of small economies of scale in Tonga, since Ghana and Mozam-
bique, which receive the same total volume of remittances as Tonga, 
have costs of 5 percent or less for sending this amount.
These high costs of sending money in the Pacific therefore sug-
gest that there is room for policies aimed at lowering these costs. The 
question that then arises is how sensitive remittance senders are to the 
cost. We asked Tongan migrants in New Zealand how much they sent 
Figure 6.2  Remittance Costs from New Zealand to Tonga by  
various Means






























SOURCE: Adapted from Gibson, McKenzie, and Rohorua (2006).
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in their last remittance transaction, the cost of sending this, and how 
much they would have sent if fees had been only half as much. Based 
on these answers, Gibson, McKenzie, and Rohorua (2006) estimate 
that the average cost-elasticity of remittances is −0.22, so that when 
costs fall, remitters will send more remittances. As an example, if the 
cost of sending from New Zealand to Tonga were to fall to levels just 
above those between the United States and Mexico, we calculate that 
instead of sending NZ$200, remitters would send NZ$228, and receiv-
ing households would experience a 27.5 percent increase in the amount 
of remittances received in local currency.9 Given the large share remit-
tances already make up in household incomes, this is a sizable potential 
gain.
Figure	6.3		Comparison	of	Remittance	Costs	in	the	Pacific	to	those	from	





































NOTE: Amounts shown are based on Western Union rates from Australia and Money-
gram rates from the United States.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from supplementary data collected on remittance 
costs.
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WHAT CAN BE DoNE To REDUCE CoSTS?
These high costs therefore do suggest that there is scope for increas-
ing remittances, even in a country like Tonga, which already receives a 
large amount. What, then, can be done to reduce remittance costs? The 
World Bank’s (2005) recent Global	Economic	Prospects	2006 report on 
remittances emphasizes three policies for lowering remittance transac-
tion costs: 
 1) Promoting competition,
 2) Improving access of migrants to the financial system, and
 3) Disseminating information.
In the case of the Pacific, migrants do have a range of options avail-
able for sending money. The small size of these economies suggests 
that there is likely to be a limit on the number of separate banks and 
money transfer operators that can offer services. I therefore do not think 
there is much scope for enhancing competition through further entry of 
new remittance providers. All of the Tongan migrants we surveyed in 
New Zealand who send remittances have bank accounts, and 98 percent 
have ATM cards. Among the sample of households in Tonga, 79 percent 
have bank accounts and 54 percent have ATM cards. ANZ and Westpac 
banks both have four ATM locations in Tonga, and Western Union has 
18 locations. There is thus some scope for expansion of access to finan-
cial services within Tonga, which would make it easier for migrants’ 
family members to receive remittances through direct bank transfers 
and ATMs. As we saw, the ATM card transaction has by far the lowest 
fee, so any expansion of this channel can potentially have a large effect 
on reducing costs.
What would be the effect of information dissemination? The pricing 
of remittance transactions is rather opaque, particularly with regard to 
the exchange rate component. Phone calls to several of the nonbank re-
mittance-sending companies were met with suspicion and, in some cas-
es, refusal to provide information on the exchange rate or cost of send-
ing without our visiting the office in person. Moreover, many migrants 
are not aware of the size of the commission being charged, or of what 
the interbank exchange rate actually is. We asked migrants in New Zea-
land and remittance receivers in Tonga what the New Zealand-to-Tonga 
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exchange rate was. Figure 6.4 shows a histogram of the answers from 
those in Tonga; the dual vertical lines show the Westpac/ANZ exchange 
rate (left line) and the Interbank exchange rate (right line). Although the 
exchange rate was stable over the survey period, the mean and median 
exchange rate quoted by the Tongan remittance receivers both missed 
the mark widely—they are around 120 pa’anga per NZ$100, which un-
derstates the true exchange rate (136 pa’anga per NZ$100) by about 12 
percent. Similarly, among migrants sending remittances, the mean re-
ported exchange rate was 122 pa’anga per NZ$100. Therefore, Tongans 
displayed a wide lack of knowledge about the exchange rate whether 
they were sending or receiving remittances—thus affording remittance 
companies an opportunity to extract high commissions.
In addition to possessing incomplete information about the exchange 
rate, many remittance senders and receivers have a limited knowledge 
about the variety of different remittance-sending methods that are avail-
able. The PINZMS survey asked senders and receivers whether they 
knew about particular methods and whether they had used them. Table 
Figure 6.4  Tongans’ Estimates of the New Zealand–Tonga Exchange 
Rate (pa’anga per NZ$100)
NOTE: Left line marks the Westpac/ANZ exchange rate; right line shows where the 
Interbank exchange rate falls.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from PINZMS (2007) data.
Figure 6.4: Tongans' estimates of the Tonga-New Zealand exchange rate
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6.2 shows that almost all remitters and remittees know about Western 
Union and most have used it. Only about half of the remitters in New 
Zealand know how to send bank transfers by means of various banks, 
and much fewer than half actually do so. Melie mei Langi is known and 
used by about half the migrants but is less well known among the re-
ceivers, who know more about Moneygram.10 Despite ATMs being the 
cheapest method, only 2 percent know about sending money this way. 
None of the respondents knew about iKobo.com, a low-cost Internet-
based method for sending money. 





Channel Know Use Know Use
Friend or relative paying for airfare 6.8 2.9
Friend or relative bringing back 
money on visit
4.5 4.9
Sending/receiving money through 
family/friends visiting overseas
13.6 4.4
Sending/receiving money through 
another person
45.5 28.6
Sending/receiving money through 
my church
9.1 2.3 1.5 0.5
Traveler’s check 2.3 0.0 1.5 0.5
Bank transfer through ANZ 47.7 0.0 13.1 5.3
Bank transfer through Westpac 52.3 4.5 13.1 4.9
Bank transfer through another bank 38.6 2.3 8.7 1.5
Western Union 95.5 77.3 92.2 90.3
Travelex 6.8 6.8 1.5 1.0
Moneygram 6.8 2.3 46.6 43.7
Melie mei Langi 47.7 47.7 24.8 24.8
iKobo.com 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ATM card or credit card from 
relative
2.3 2.3 2.4 1.0
Sample size 49 49 206 206
NOTE: Knowledge of the first four categories was assumed.
SOURCE: PINZMS (2007).
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Thus, while competition does exist, and while migrants and their 
families generally do have access to bank accounts, the ability of both 
of these factors to help lower remittance costs seems to be hampered 
by a lack of information. There appears to be a role for information dis-
semination in increasing the benefits of competition and allowing mi-
grants to obtain lower costs. The relatively small size of migrant com-
munities may act as a barrier to widespread advertising campaigns by 
money transfer companies, and the time involved in researching their 
options may make it hard for individual migrants to know whether or 
not they are getting a good deal. This then suggests a role for commu-
nity organizations or migrant news organizations, which could better 
disseminate this information.11 Weekly newspapers that have as their 
audience the Fijian, Tongan, and Samoan communities in New Zealand 
could provide a listing of the fixed-cost exchange rate premium and the 
amounts received from sending $NZ100 and $NZ200 by way of differ-
ent mechanisms. 
WHAT DoES A RICHER REMITTANCE SURvEY TELL US 
ABoUT REMITTANCES?
The second part of this chapter involves dimensions of remittances 
that standard surveys and official statistics may not pick up very well. 
Standard household income and expenditure surveys typically ask for 
little detailed information about remittances. For example, the ENIGH 
surveys in Mexico only report the annual value of remittances received 
by households.12 Even more specialized migration surveys such as the 
Mexican Migration Project (MMP93) and the Latin American Migra-
tion Project (LAMP) only ask respondents for the average monthly 
remittances sent and the purpose of these remittances.13 In contrast, 
the PINZMS has 10 pages of questions on remittances and thus is 
able to provide richer detail on some important aspects of remittance 
transactions.
The first aspect of the various dimensions of remittance surveys that 
I consider is what is being measured by remittances. Officially record-
ed remittances form a large share of GDP in many Pacific countries, 
but they do not capture all of the remittance action occurring. First, as 
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seen in Table 6.2, a number of remittance transactions occur through 
informal channels, such as sending money back with friends or family 
visiting from overseas. Second, in addition to cash, migrants also remit 
goods such as consumer durables. These can be particularly important 
in small island economies where the supply of durable goods is limited 
and prices are higher than in the migrant destinations. For the sample of 
14 durable goods shown in Figure 6.5, the price in Tonga averages 1.7 
times the price in New Zealand.
The PINZMS asked migrants separately about the remittances they 
had sent as monetary transfers and the remittances sent in the form of 
goods. On average, cash remittances accounted for 75 percent of to-
tal remittances sent and 63 percent of total remittances received by all 
remittance receivers in Tonga (not just those receiving from the New 
Zealand sample). Therefore surveys and official statistics that focus 
solely on monetary transfers in the Pacific Islands are likely to miss 
25–40 percent of remittance transactions. Goods remittances are also 
important in other areas of the world, although more work elsewhere is 
Figure 6.5  Ratio of Price of Durable goods in Tonga to Price in  

































































SOURCE: Prices collected in New Zealand and Tonga in September 2005 for the 
PINZMS (2007) data set.
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needed to generalize this result to obtain an estimate of the undercount 
of remittances at a world level.
Another understudied aspect of remittance transactions is reverse 
flows. Migrants not only send cash and goods to family members back 
home but also receive them from home. Twenty-two percent of the mi-
grants who had sent remittances from New Zealand to Tonga had also 
received remittances from Tonga. However, remittances received are 
mostly in the form of goods rather than cash—on average, cash received 
by migrants accounts for only 11 percent of the total remittances they 
receive, whereas goods account for 89 percent. These goods often tend 
to be handicrafts, food, and other goods that carry nostalgic value. On 
average these goods equal 43 percent of the value of remittances sent by 
the migrants in New Zealand, meaning that the net flow of remittances 
is substantially smaller than the gross flow.14 
The next aspect that a richer survey reveals is that many remittanc-
es do not come from former household members. Figure 6.6 uses the 
sample of remittance receivers in Tonga to plot the share of remittances 
received according to the sender’s relationship to the household head. 
Both value shares and frequency shares are shown, in case one or two 
very rich relatives are driving all of the value share results. Remittances 
received by former household members who moved to New Zealand 
through the Pacific Access Category (that is, PAC household members) 
are the only remittances that we know for sure came from a former 
household member. Spouses abroad are also almost certain to be former 
household members, while children would have been household mem-
bers at some stage but may have been living outside of the household 
before migration. These three groups, however, together account for 
only 34 percent of the value of remittances received and 21 percent of 
the number of remittance transactions.
Parents of the head and spouse of the head may or may not have lived 
with the household before migration. Siblings of the household head are 
much more likely to send remittances than siblings of the spouse of the 
head. However, it is likely that many of these brothers and sisters of 
the head were not living in the household before migration. The largest 
source of remittances is other relatives, such as cousins, uncles, aunts, 
grandparents, and other extended family. This shows that the benefits 
of a single individual migrating spread beyond the household he or she 
was living in at the time, and that the extended family benefits from 
Pozo Book.indb   112 4/18/2007   10:03:20 AM
Remittances in the Pacific   113




Sibling of head  7.4










Parent of spouse  4.7

















NOTE: Percentages in top chart do not add up to 100 percent because of rounding. In 
the bottom chart, the term “Frequency Shares” refers to the share of the number of 
transactions contributed by each category of remitter.
SOURCE: PINZMS (2007).
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these remittances as well. The mean remitter sends remittances to 1.25 
distinct groups of people, and the mean remittance-receiving household 
in Tonga receives remittances from 1.22 people. However, these means 
are the result of a few individuals sending or receiving remittances to or 
from three people—the median remitter only sends remittances to one 
person, and the median remittee only receives remittances from one 
person, just not necessarily a former household member.
WHY MIgHT REMITTANCES BE SPENT DIFFERENTLY 
FRoM oTHER FoRMS oF INCoME?
The development impact of remittances depends on their sustain-
ability and what remittances are spent on. Many studies have looked to 
see if remittances are spent differently from other sources of income. 
One reason remittances might be spent differently is that migrants send 
remittances in response to specific events, or conditional on certain ac-
tions being taken. Remittance receivers in Tonga reported that 66 per-
cent of all remittance transactions received were earmarked for a spe-
cial purpose. The main purposes were the misinale (a once-a-year gift 
made to the church [Puloka 2003]), which accounted for 33 percent 
of special purpose remittances, 28 percent of payment of school fees, 
and 14 percent of funeral expenses. Remittances received for funeral 
expenses can be considered a form of insurance, and therefore will be 
spent differently than an increase in general household income. Remit-
tances sent for other special purposes will only alter spending patterns 
compared to the same increase in household income if the conditions 
placed on them are binding, or if the fact that they are received as remit-
tances increases the cost of certain expenses. This might be the case for 
misinale payments and schooling, if families receiving remittances are 
expected to pay more.15
A second reason remittances may be spent differently than other 
sources of income is that households view them as being more tempo-
rary in nature. Standard economic theory suggests that households will 
save a larger fraction of transitory income (or invest it in schooling and 
housing) than they would for permanent income. However, the cross-
sectional nature of existing remittance surveys provides us with little 
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information on how households expect remittances to vary over time, 
and whether these expectations match those of the migrants.
Our survey asked migrants what they thought the percent chance 
was that they would remit in 1 year’s time if they were still in New 
Zealand. This was followed by similar questions for 5 and 10 years’ 
time. Similarly, the head of the household that the migrant had been a 
part of was asked what he or she thought was the percent chance that the 
migrant would remit in 1, 5, and 10 years’ time if the migrant was still 
in New Zealand. We were able to match 28 migrants to their remaining 
family members. Table 6.3 shows the average percent chance reported 
for different periods. On average, migrants and their families have very 
similar expectations: both have high expectations of remittances occur-
ring 1 year out, but lower expectations of remittances occurring in 5 and 
10 years. That is, many remittance receivers believe that remittances 
will be a short-term source of income.
Not only does the average expectation of receiving remittances de-
cline over time, but the expectation declines for almost every single 
family. Figure 6.7 shows that families with higher expectations of re-
ceiving remittances in 1 year also have higher expectations of receiving 
remittances in 5 and 10 years, but that the percent chance of receiving 
is almost always less than the 1-year-out expectation.
However, although on average migrants and their families have 
similar expectations, when we look at the matched pairs, a very dif-
ferent pattern arises. Figure 6.8 shows the match between migrant and 
family expectations for remittances in 1 year and in 10 years. There is a 
much looser relationship for expectations 1 year out than 10 years out: 
the rank-order correlation is 0.27 for 1 year (insignificantly different 
from zero) and 0.43 for 10 years (significantly different from zero at the 
0.05 level). At 1 year out, there is a group of migrants who have very 




In 1 year’s time 79.6 78.1
In 5 years’ time 63.7 68.3
In 10 years’ time 31.5 36.9
SOURCE: PINZMS (2007).
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high expectations of remitting, but whose families have low expecta-
tions of receiving remittances, and another group whose families expect 
remittances, but who don’t expect to be sending them. 
This difference between the remittance expectations of migrants 
and their families 1 year out may reflect uncertainty over how long it 
will take the migrant to get settled in his new country and start earn-
ing sufficient income to send remittances. Regression of the difference 
between the family’s expectations and the migrant’s expectations on 
characteristics of the migrant finds the family to have higher expecta-
tions than the migrant when the migrant is currently unemployed, and 
when the migrant states there is a high probability of losing his job in 
the next year and a low probability of being employed in 1 year’s time. 
However, these correlates are only suggestive; as with the small sample 
Figure 6.7  Expectations of Receiving Remittances Decay over Time
NOTE: The data consist of pairs of expectations, where an x,y pairing of (1-year ex-
pectation, 5-year expectation) is represented by one set of dots, and an x,y pairing of 
(1-year expectation, 10-year expectation) is represented by another set of dots. The 
45-degree line shows what the 5- and 10-year expectations would be if they were the 
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size of matched observations, no explanatory variables were significant 
in the regression.16 In contrast, expectations are much more aligned 10 
years out—this is sufficiently long enough for migrants to have become 
established and to have found a good job.
Note that both migrants and their families have lower expectations 
of remittances being sent in 10 years’ time than they do in one year’s 
time. This decay in the probability of sending remittances suggests that 
remittances are viewed as a transitory form of income, which suggests 
that receiving households should save or invest a higher proportion of 
the income received from remittances than they would from a wage 
income that was higher by the same amount. Nevertheless, this does 
not necessarily mean that the level of remittances received by Tonga 
from this group of Tongan migrants will decay over time—it may be the 
case that falling probabilities of remitting are accompanied by higher 
Figure 6.8  Relationship between Migrant and Family Expectations for 
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amounts sent when remittances actually do occur. Most existing studies 
of remittance decay are cross-sectional in nature and thus not able to 
capture these dynamic aspects.17 
CoNCLUSIoN
Migration and remittances are of large importance to a number of 
Pacific Island nations. This chapter has attempted to show that even 
though these countries currently receive a lot of remittances, there is 
still scope for further remittance growth, because the high costs of send-
ing money may discourage some remittance. Expansion of ATM ser-
vices and provision of information on exchange rate commissions and 
the remittance options available seem promising avenues for lowering 
these costs.
I have also highlighted some aspects of remittances that may not 
so easily be seen in traditional surveys. Remittances occur as goods as 
well as cash, are often accompanied by sizable reverse flows, and, at 
least in the case of the Pacific Islands, are sent to the extended family 
in addition to direct household members. Matching migrants to their 
remaining household members shows that both groups expect the like-
lihood of remittances occurring to decrease with the time spent over-
seas, and that there is more concurrence in expectations in the long term 
than in the short term. These findings are drawn from a rather small 
sample of matched migrants, and so in future research it will be useful 
to see whether they hold for larger samples and for migrants from other 
countries.
Notes
 This chapter builds on surveys and joint work conducted with John Gibson and 
Halahingano Rohorua. Thanks to John Gibson for useful comments.
 1. Measurement of migration stocks and remittances received is poor in a number 
of countries, so the numbers in Table 6.1 should be treated with caution.
  2. The population of Niue is 1,761, yet 5,328 Niue-born citizens live in New Zea-
land; Tokelau’s population is 1,513, yet 1,662 Tokelau-born citizens live in New 
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Zealand. These figures are according to the Government of Niue (2004) and Sta-
tistics New Zealand (2001a,b).
  3. Connell and Brown (2005) provide a recent overview of remittances in Pacific 
Island countries and discuss reasons why some of the relatively high-migration 
islands receive small remittances. 
 4. This section is based on information from The	World	Factbook (CIA 2006) and 
from Te	Ara:	The	Encyclopedia	of	New	Zealand (Taumoefolau 2006).
 5. The PINZMS data come from a survey conducted by the author. A Web site dedi-
cated to reporting the findings of this survey is at http://www.pacificmigration 
.ac.nz.
 6. Costs of sending from New Zealand to Tonga were collected in March 2005, at 
the time of the PINZMS survey (see Gibson, McKenzie, and Rohorua [2006] 
for details). Costs of sending from Australia and the United States via Western 
Union and Moneygram were collected in January 2006.
  7. A third potential cost faced by the receiver is a charge for receiving remittances. 
For example, Westpac Bank in Tonga charges a fee to receive a telegraphic trans-
fer or deposit a bank draft. Western Union typically does not charge the recipi-
ent, although there may be a fee to notify the recipient if he or she is in a distant 
location. A fourth cost that occurs in some areas of the world is the “float” or 
overnight interest collected by remittance companies (World Bank 2005). This is 
not a major element in the Pacific.
 8. As obtained from http://www.oanda.com. The interbank rate is the market rate 
used between banks for transactions of US$1 million or more. This is the “of-
ficial rate” typically quoted in the media.
 9. The percentage increase in remittances received in local currency is the com-
bination of two factors: 1) for each New Zealand dollar of remittances sent, a 
reduction in remittance costs leads to more Tongan pa’anga being received, and 
2) senders in New Zealand also will send more New Zealand dollars when remit-
tance costs fall. The 27.5 percent increase in local currency is the combination of 
these two factors.
 10. Note that the sample of receivers includes those receiving money from family 
members who have migrated to New Zealand, Australia, and the United States 
through other methods than the Pacific Access Category, the category that the 
sample of migrants come from.
11. An alternative would be for the Pacific Island consulates to provide this service 
for their migrants. Mexico’s consulates in the United States collect weekly data 
on the costs of sending money from nine cities in the United States and publish 
it on Mexico’s consumer protection Web site, http://www.profeco.gob.mx.
 12. ENIGH stands for Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares, or the 
National Survey of Household Incomes and Expenses.
 13. See Amuedo-Dorantes (2005) and documentation on the MMP93 and LAMP Web 
pages, found at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu and http://lamp.opr.princeton.edu, 
respectively. The questionnaires are contained at http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/
databases/ethnosurvey-en.aspx and http://lamp.opr.princeton.edu/documents-en 
.aspx.
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 14. This pattern of bidirectional remittance flows involving goods as well as cash 
corresponds to findings of other remittance studies in the Pacific. See Connell 
and Brown (2005) for a review.
 15. This may be because families with migrants are expected to contribute more to 
local public goods since having a migrant member is seen as a source of wealth, 
as well as because migrant members planning on returning may be expected to 
contribute to local public goods while away, so that the family merely acts as an 
intermediary between the migrant and the community.
 16. I also tried regressing the difference and the absolute difference in expectations 
on age, education, sex, marital status, past income in Tonga, current income in 
New Zealand, the difference in income, and the difference in employment status. 
These variables were tried one by one, and also in groups. Current unemploy-
ment had the largest economic effect (associated with a 23 percent gap in expec-
tations) and the highest t-statistic (1.4) in this regression.
17. Connell and Brown (2005) survey several studies of remittance decay in the 
Pacific and conclude there is little statistically significant evidence for remit-
tance decay. There are two main concerns with many of these cross-sectional 
studies. The first is that they may rely on community networks to obtain a sample 
of migrants, so that only migrants who remain tied to their communities (and 
hence more likely to continue remitting) appear in the sample. If more recent 
migrants are more likely to rely on membership of these ethnic networks, this 
will result in a systematic bias against finding remittance decay. Second, these 
studies are generally unable to control for return migration. If individuals who 
are less successful in the migrant destination are more likely to return, then the 
only migrants in the sample who have been in the host country for a long period 
of time are successful migrants who can send large amounts of remittances.
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The Power of Home
Remittances to Families and Communities
Leah K. VanWey
Indiana	University
The past two decades have seen a rapid increase in the value of 
international migrant remittances; in 2005, their value worldwide con-
servatively was estimated at $167 billion per year (World Bank 2005). 
In many cases, these remittances represent a substantial percentage of 
a migrant-sending country’s income and overshadow the official de-
velopment aid sent from other countries. This has led to research that 
attempts to determine the effects of remittances on economic devel-
opment; it has also led to government efforts to encourage the use of 
remittances for development projects. The body of research is largely 
inconclusive, as some studies show positive effects and some show that 
remittances have no effect or negative effects on development. This 
chapter makes the case that a more complete consideration of the differ-
ent types of migration around the world, and of the role of social institu-
tions in influencing motivations for remittances, can help us understand 
these contradictory findings. I develop a typology of migration-remit-
tance systems based on a consideration of social institutions, and I pres-
ent examples of each type. I conclude with some thoughts about how 
to construct a theory of the process linking migration and remittances 
that will predict the future volume of remittances and their effects on 
economic development.
Past research has focused less on this complete process and more 
on either the motivations of individual migrants or the uses and effects 
of remittances. The literature on remittances in the 1970s and 1980s 
looks at remittances from temporary migrants to their wives, children, 
and parents in their home communities (Dinerman 1978; Reichert 
1981; Rempel and Lobdell 1978; Rubenstein 1992; Weist 1984). The 
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migrants studied were primarily adult male heads of household who 
had left their fellow household members behind in the home communi-
ties. Researchers in this tradition often focused on the ways in which 
remittances were spent. They argued that migration was motivated by 
a lack of employment or a low financial return to agriculture in home 
communities. Migrants left in order to earn money to meet the family’s 
current consumption needs. Therefore, virtually all of the remittances 
were spent on consumption. These studies are largely pessimistic about 
the potential for remittances to contribute to the economic development 
of the home communities. In the words of Joshua Reichert (1981, p. 
64), migration “actually serves to maintain (if not increase) the very 
conditions of underdevelopment, underemployment, and unequal dis-
tribution of capital resources that make migration necessary in the first 
place.”
In contrast, the 1990s and early 2000s saw the expansion of a more 
nuanced approach to remittances, which largely followed the New 
Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) approach to migration (Stark 
1991; Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark and Lucas 1988; Taylor 1992, 1999; 
Taylor, Rozelle, and de Brauw 2003). NELM sees migration as a re-
sponse to market failures in developing countries and remittances as 
part and parcel of the migration process. Migrants leave in large part in 
order to generate remittances for their home households. The remittanc-
es allow the home households to meet consumption needs when other 
income sources fail, and the remittances also provide them with cash 
for large purchases. These remittances thus substitute for insurance, 
smoothing consumption and allowing the home household to undertake 
riskier agricultural endeavors. They substitute as well for credit mar-
kets, allowing the household to make investments that would otherwise 
be impossible. Researchers in this tradition have, in particular, exam-
ined the effects of remittances by considering whole household budgets 
rather than only considering the way the remittances themselves are 
spent. Their research shows that remittances loosen household budget 
constraints, allowing for productive investment as well as increases in 
consumption (Taylor and Wyatt 1996).
Within this tradition, research has also challenged the pessimistic 
view of the effects of remittances that are spent on consumption (Durand 
et al. 1996; Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996; Massey and Parrado 
1994). Migrant-sending households use some of the remittances that 
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are spent on consumption for purchase of local and regional products 
and services. This spending then drives local and regional economic 
growth by increasing demand for products and services. Estimates 
of the multiplier effect of remittances—the amount that the economy 
grows as a result of each dollar remitted—show the importance of re-
mittances for economic growth in migrant-sending countries (Taylor 
1999; Taylor et al. 1996; World Bank 2005). However, the effect of 
remittances on home communities is less clear, as it depends on how 
much of the spending of remittances goes for consumer goods from 
elsewhere in the country or from the migration destinations.
At the same time, other researchers were focusing on individual 
motivations for remittances, generally within a framework of com-
paring altruistic motivations to contractual (or exchange) motivations 
(Agarwal and Horowitz 2002; Hoddinott 1994; Lucas and Stark 1985; 
Secondi 1997; Stark 1999; Stark and Lucas 1988; VanWey 2004). This 
research finds that remittance (and migration) patterns vary with the 
individual characteristics of the migrant. The gender of the migrant, for 
instance, has important implications for how much and what type of 
remittance is sent (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; de la Brière et al. 
2002; Osaki 1999; Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2005; VanWey 2004). 
The length of migration (Brown 1998) and the age and marital status of 
the migrant also significantly affect the propensity to remit. While these 
and other studies take the NELM approach of examining the reasons 
for the decision to migrate, they also pay attention to the social and cul-
tural context in order to understand who remits, when, and how much. 
Social networks affect both the pressure to remit and the ability to remit 
(Roberts and Morris 2003), while social norms influence the expecta-
tion by the migrant and the family that a particular type of migrant will 
remit (Osaki 1999; VanWey 2004). This research also generates debate, 
in this case about the motivations for remittances. Some studies find 
support for altruistic motivations, while others find only support for 
exchange motivations.
Since approximately the turn of the century researchers have been 
examining a relatively new form of remittance, sometimes called “col-
lective remittances” (Goldring 2004) and sometimes called “social re-
mittances” (Alarcon 2002). These are remittances collected by a group 
of migrants in a shared destination and returned to their home com-
munity for some sort of community project. These projects include 
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social events (such as rodeos and festivals honoring patron saints), 
infrastructure projects (paving roads, constructing or repairing build-
ings, installing sewer service), and scholarships for schoolchildren 
(DeSipio 2002). These have been most extensively studied in modern-
day Mexico (Goldring 2004), but this form of remittance is also found 
in other countries and other eras (Foner 2000; Mohan 2002; Mohan and 
Zack-Williams 2002).
There are inconsistent findings about the causes and consequences 
of this form of remittance as well. Cohen (2001) argues that migrants 
provide these remittances in order to improve their social status in the 
home community and not out of any altruistic motive. Others contend 
that migrants are motivated by a concern for the welfare of their home 
community and by a desire to give back to the community (de la Garza 
and Lowell 2002). The Mexican government is banking on the sec-
ond motivation and is encouraging migrants to act on it even more: the 
government has begun a policy of providing matching funds for remit-
tances sent back for community projects. 
Even more vigorously debated is the effect of these projects on 
community development. Binford (2003) argues that these community 
projects do not always benefit the whole community, and that often the 
projects are social in nature and thus have no lasting impact on the com-
munity. At the same time, others hold that these projects have positive 
effects on their own and that they build capacity in the communities. By 
organizing to complete a project, particularly one that requires interact-
ing with the government to get matching funds, communities develop 
organizational skills that were not present previously (Díaz-Briquets 
and Pérez-López 1997; Vertovec 2004).
This chapter seeks to understand the reasons for some of the varia-
tion in results researchers have found concerning the motivations of 
migrants to remit and the effects of remittances on economic develop-
ment. I argue that social institutions in the home community and the 
institutionalization of the migration process have important effects on 
the economic actions of individual migrants. Migration and remittance 
have traditionally been considered to be individual decisions, motivated 
by economic concerns. Most simply put, individuals move to places 
where they expect to make the most money over the long term (Massey 
and García España 1987; Todaro 1969). Remittances belie the focus on 
individuals by showing that migration can be a household or a family 
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decision (Stark and Lucas 1988). However, this focus on individuals 
versus households, with some additional consideration of economic 
context, has led to contradictory arguments about motivations for re-
mittances, about the levels of remittances to be expected, and about the 
effects of remittances on development. Given the particular importance 
of social institutions in influencing gendered family roles and migra-
tion (described in the next section), I propose a typology of migration- 
remittance systems that have distinct underlying rationales and effects 
on economic development in the home community. In this chapter, I 
argue that a more careful consideration of the type of migrants com-
ing from a community (a factor that is based in some part on how well 
developed migration streams are), and of the social institutions in that 
community, will clarify some of the contradictions.
THE IMPoRTANCE oF SoCIAL INSTITUTIoNS
All migrants are someone’s child, spouse, or parent. The organization 
of the family and the expectations of individuals filling various roles in 
the family influence both migration and remittances. The expectations 
regarding the behavior of individuals in various roles (parent, child, 
spouse) are also determined by the gender expectations of the commu-
nity (or country). The combination of gender and family position deter-
mines both the ability of an individual to migrate and the expectations 
of support from any given individual to various others in the family. For 
example, in many countries social rules indicate that unmarried daugh-
ters cannot work (or sometimes even travel) outside the home without 
supervision by fathers or other male relatives. Often, social rules dictate 
that one spouse cares for the home while the other provides financial or 
subsistence support. Similarly, societies vary in the extent to which un-
married children old enough to migrate are expected to contribute do-
mestic work or income to their parents’ household. Flows of money and 
other forms of support from parents to married children or vice versa 
are also structured by social norms, and strong norms of filial support 
for aging parents are common in many high-migration societies. Such 
norms are also gendered: social norms often indicate that support for 
parents is provided by one particular child (e.g., the youngest daughter, 
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the oldest son) or by one gender of child. Research shows that this often 
leads to differential investment by parents, as parents give more support 
to the child who is expected to later support them.
The institutions developed around the migration process itself also 
have important implications for understanding remittances. As migra-
tion becomes more common in a community, the process becomes insti-
tutionalized, with widely known procedures and widespread opportuni-
ty for migration (Massey 1990; Massey et al. 1994). This leads both to 
expansion of opportunity to migrate regardless of differences in wealth 
and education and to more organization of migrants in the destination 
areas. As the migration stream focuses on one or a few destinations and 
the population of migrants from a common home community and hav-
ing common experiences grows, migrants in destinations form organi-
zations based on common home communities (hometown associations). 
These associations then partially structure the way in which migrants 
interact with their home communities, affecting the types, amounts, and 
uses of remittances that they send.
A TYPoLogY oF MIgRATIoN-REMITTANCE SYSTEMS
Because of the importance of the roles that migrants or potential 
migrants play in their families, the typology I propose here focuses in 
part on the changing types of migrants in terms of their family statuses. 
The first type of migration-remittance system is a system in which the 
majority of migrants are male heads of household, the traditional bread-
winners in most migrant-sending societies. The second type of system 
is one in which the majority of migrants are young adults leaving their 
parents’ home to migrate before they have begun to form their own 
families. The third is a system in which migration is widespread among 
most types of people in a community. In this type, migration is common 
enough that hometown associations have formed in the destination, and 
exchanges of people, ideas, and money between home and destination 
are common. In this next section, I describe the underlying logic of the 
migration and remittance decisions for each type and then provide an 
example of each system from past research.
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Migrant Male Heads of Household
The early research on international migrants and their remittances, 
based largely on international migration from Mexico to the United 
States, argued that men were leaving their wives and children in their 
home communities in order to earn money to support them (Dinerman 
1978; Massey et al. 1987; Reichert 1981; Weist 1984). These migrants 
were characterized as target earners who came to the United States to 
earn money because of a shortage of well-paying jobs in their home 
communities. Once they earned the target amount—whether it be for 
consumption for the next year, for a house, or for a piece of land—they 
returned to their families. The logic underlying this type of migration 
and remittance is simple: men in migrant-sending regions are unable to 
earn enough money to start a family (which involves the purchase of 
materials to build a house and the purchase of a piece of land to begin 
farming) or to continue supporting their family (either through earning 
a regular income or by investing in a new business or improvements to 
their farm). 
Migration is an attractive alternative because of the large amounts 
(relative to the incomes in the home community) that can be earned 
in relatively short periods of time. Migration becomes most attractive 
when wages are low or unemployment is high in the home community 
(Todaro 1969), but it also springs from a failure in certain key economic 
markets (Stark and Bloom 1985). In particular, most migrant-sending 
regions have no functional credit or insurance markets. Couples can-
not buy a house on credit when they get married; they must have the 
money in hand. Similarly, new farm machinery or inventory for a new 
small business must be purchased with cash. Insurance against high 
health care costs, the failure of crops, and unexpected unemployment is 
similarly unavailable, making families vulnerable to a dramatic decline 
in standard of living following these events. To overcome these market 
failures, to get cash for planned or unplanned expenses, men migrate for 
short periods to earn specified amounts of money.
The reasoning (based on the migrant’s gender-specific role in the 
family) that motivates these men to both migrate and send (or bring) 
remittances to their homes is the same reasoning that motivates them to 
get any sort of job and spend the income on family needs. In Mexico, 
the majority of migrants have traditionally been men because of norms 
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about appropriate behavior for men and women. Men are expected to 
support their families by working outside the home and bringing home 
income. Thus, men not only are expected to earn income, but they have 
greater freedom of movement outside of the home, making them the 
clear choice for migration. Following this logic, it is also a foregone 
conclusion that men will send or bring money home. They migrate 
solely for the purpose of earning money, and they will be viewed as 
having failed to support their families if they are not able to send or 
bring money home.
Massey and colleagues provide clear descriptions of this type of mi-
gration from four communities in western Mexico in their book Return	
to	Aztlán (Massey et al. 1987) and in later works (Durand, Parrado, and 
Massey 1996; Massey and Parrado 1994; Parrado 2004). They show 
that the lifetime probability of migration is very high for men in their 
study communities, the result of a predictable pattern of migration over 
the lives of these men. Massey et al. (1987, p. 200) find that “active mi-
gration begins at a high level among young unmarried men, falls after 
marriage, rises with the arrival of children, and then falls again as the 
children mature and leave home. In short, over the course of a man’s 
life cycle, active migration rises and falls depending on family needs, 
while the number with migrant experience steadily grows.”
The level of migration varies from community to community, de-
pending on economic conditions, but the pattern over the life cycle 
holds across communities. Parrado (2004) finds that getting the money 
necessary to set up an independent household is a strong motivator for 
migration among young men. Massey and Parrado (1994) also find high 
rates of remitting among migrant household heads (as opposed to un-
married migrants). Using an updated set of survey data covering 22 
communities, they estimate that 73 percent of household heads remit-
ted during their last trip to the United States (p. 11), while 58 percent 
brought money back when they returned (p. 14).
Migrant Children
The second type of migration and remittance in my typology in-
volves the migration of adult children out of their parents’ households 
and their home communities. Like the first type, these moves are often 
planned as temporary moves, in which children come to work in urban 
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areas or international destinations for a short period of time between 
stopping school and marrying. Thus the money that they send back is 
sent to their parents rather than to spouses or children. This type of mi-
gration has been extensively studied in Southeast Asia (Elmhirst 2002; 
Lauby and Stark 1988; Osaki 1999; Trager 1988; VanWey 2004) and in 
Africa (Hoddinott 1994; Lucas and Stark 1985; Oberai and Singh 1980; 
Stark and Lucas 1988), and it forms the basis for most of the theorizing 
about the motivations of individuals to remit.
This type of migration decision follows a different logic from that 
of the decision of male household heads. Theorists have argued that 
the decision for these children to migrate is at least partly a household 
decision, in which parents allocate themselves and their still-dependent 
children to local or nonlocal employment in order to minimize risk and 
smooth consumption (Massey et al. 1993; Stark and Lucas 1988). Thus 
the expectation of remittances on the part of the home household is 
an integral part of the migration decision. The home households are 
generally in areas where they face imperfectly functioning or absent 
markets, leading to a lack of affordable credit and to a lack of insurance 
against crop failures or price fluctuations. By being employed off-farm, 
migrants provide much-needed cash income for a variety of household 
purchases. Migration also provides good insurance against income 
shortfalls because migrants are generally in a geographic region or a 
sector of the economy providing income that does not covary with the 
income of the home household. For example, the failure of a rice crop 
in a migrant-sending region of rural Thailand is generally unrelated to 
the income earned by a migrant working in construction in Bangkok. If 
the crop fails or rice prices drop and the home household cannot meet 
consumption needs, the migrant will still have income that can be used 
to support the family.
Even though home households send migrants with the expectation 
of remittances to meet the needs of all household members, the results 
of empirical studies of this type of migrant show that, at the same time, 
migrants are self-interested actors (Hoddinott 1994; Lucas and Stark 
1985; Stark and Lucas 1988). Migration is important to young adults 
for improving skills and long-term earning potential, and for meeting 
new people and seeing new places. It can also be a way for migrants 
to escape the control of their parents and home communities. Thus the 
remittances that households receive from these migrants are not com-
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pletely unselfish. Research shows that home households and migrants 
engage in informal bargaining, with migrants remitting more to the ex-
tent that they expect to benefit more from their relationships with their 
home households.
The findings on remittances among these young adult migrants 
closely mirror general studies and theories of intergenerational transfers 
in the developing world. As in much of the literature on remittances, the 
intergenerational transfers literature distinguishes between altruistic mo-
tivations on the part of children for supporting their parents (considering 
the parents’ needs and sending support in response to those needs) and 
exchange motivations, in which the transfers between generations are 
part of a bargain that benefits both children and parents (Frankenberg, 
Lillard, and Willis 2002; Lee, Parish, and Willis 1994; Lillard and Willis 
1997; Quisumbing 1994). The support for altruistic motivations for re-
mittances is relatively weak and shows that the “altruistic” behavior 
of children is structured by social norms regarding filial responsibil-
ity—children that are expected to care for their aging parents are more 
likely to behave altruistically than are other children. The literature on 
remittances also shows clear self-interested behavior on the part of mi-
grants who are children of aging parents: they remit more when they 
expect to return to their home communities (Roberts and Morris 2003; 
Sana 2005) or when their parents have more land that they may leave to 
their children in the future (Hoddinott 1994; VanWey 2004).
My work on migrants from villages in rural Thailand provides a 
good example of this type of remittance (VanWey 2004). This study ex-
amines migrants from a sample of villages in Nang Rong district, in the 
Northeast of Thailand. The majority of the migrants are children leav-
ing their parents’ home to migrate to other rural areas, to Bangkok, or 
to export-oriented manufacturing areas in the Eastern Seaboard of the 
country. I examine data from a 1994 follow-up survey, in which infor-
mation was collected from each household about remittances over the 
previous year from migrants who left the household between an earlier 
interview (in 1984) and 1994. The relationships between migrants and 
their home households are characterized by remittances in both direc-
tions, but migrants send money or goods home more often than home 
households send money or goods to migrants. Figure 7.1 shows that 
home households send some sort of remittance (money or goods) to just 
under 20 percent of migrants, while more than half of male migrants 
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and two-thirds of female migrants send some sort of remittance to their 
home households.
From this figure we can see the gender differences in the probability 
of remitting: women are much more likely to remit. Using multivariate 
statistical models, I further explored the different determinants of remit-
tances for male and female migrants. I found that both male and female 
migrants were remitting in ways that suggested self-interested behavior. 
The more land the home household owned (and therefore could leave to 
the migrant in the future), the more likely an individual migrant was to 
send remittances—but only when there were many other migrants from 
the same household. The migrants were competing with each other for 
the inheritance. However, female migrants were also acting in a way 
that suggested altruism, by remitting at higher rates when their parents 
were in the home household (as they were in most cases). They were 
substantially more likely to be supporting those parents than were their 
brothers.










Households Male migrants Female migrants
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, based on data from the Nang Rong Projects (Univer-
sity of North Carolina 2005).
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To test whether the differences between male and female migrants 
in their overall rates of remitting were due to gender differences in 
things like jobs or wealth of home households, or to differences in how 
males and females made decisions based on jobs or wealth or the needs 
of parents, I conducted a simulation analysis. I looked at what would 
happen if men were like women, both in variables like age, occupation, 
and education and in the characteristics of the households they left. I 
then looked at what would happen if each gender had its true values in 
these characteristics but behaved like the other gender. For example, 
what if men had the same jobs or education but these characteristics 
affected them in the way that they affected women? Figure 7.2 shows 
the results of this analysis. The baseline difference between men and 
women in remitting (shown in Figure 7.1) is due to differences in how 
male and female migrants respond to various characteristics, primarily 
to the presence of their parents in the home household. Even if men 




























SOURCE: Author’s calculations, based on data from the Nang Rong Projects (Univer-
sity of North Carolina 2005).
Figure 7.2  Predicted Probability of Male and Female Migrants 
Remitting, Nang Rong, Thailand, 1994
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at the same rate as women. For that result to occur, they would have to 
behave like women (bar B). Similarly, if women behaved like men (bar 
C), they would remit less than they actually do (bar D).
These results show that migrants are behaving as we would expect 
from the literature on intergenerational transfers and relationships. They 
are bargaining (implicitly) with their parents and siblings for future in-
heritance of land, and daughters are fulfilling socially expected support 
roles. In the Thai context, filial support is structured by the tenets of 
Theravada Buddhism, which say that children must earn religious merit 
on behalf of their parents to repay the parents for giving them life. Sons 
are able to do this by spending a short period (about 3 months) becom-
ing ordained monks during early adulthood, while daughters primar-
ily earn religious merit by caring for their families. Thus, daughters 
who migrate pay this debt through remittances while sons have no such 
obligation.
Collective Remittances
While some anthropologists and others have noted the importance 
of associations of migrants in destinations for migrant adaptation to 
the destination community, and for economic development projects in 
their home communities (Hirabayashi 1986), widespread study of the 
remittances from these groups to their home communities has only re-
cently begun (Alarcon 2002). This interest results from the dramatic 
increase in the value of these remittances as international remittances 
have grown in volume, and from the Mexican government’s attempt 
to capture some of these remittances for infrastructure projects and 
other development needs in home communities. Federal, state, and lo-
cal governments in Mexico now provide matching funds (the amount 
varies across the country but is usually a 100 or 200 percent match of 
funds sent by migrant associations). This type of remittance becomes 
more common as the size of the population of migrants from a given 
hometown (or home region) in a destination grows. Migrant groups are 
formed to aid migrants with adaptation and employment in the destina-
tion and for social reasons. These groups then collect money to send 
home to their home communities for parties, infrastructure projects, or 
other community needs. The extent to which the projects are initiated 
or controlled by the home communities versus the migrant associations 
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varies from community to community and is itself a function of institu-
tions in the home community, as we will see in the example presented 
below.
In this setting, the motivations for migration are similar to the pre-
vious cases, where migrants leave to earn more money and to over-
come the lack of credit and insurance in home communities. However, 
the longer history and institutionalization of migration has several im-
pacts. The increasing participation of community members in migration 
leads to migration being a less difficult choice. Migration costs less both 
financially and psychologically because of three accumulative factors: 
1) the ease of finding employment through friends, family, or the home-
town association; 2) the familiarity of the people the migrant will find 
in the destination; and 3) the number of people going back and forth. 
Migrants now include not only spouses or children but entire nuclear 
families. The hometown associations and organizations associated with 
the migration process facilitate the migration and increase the affinity 
that migrants have for home communities even in the absence of im-
mediate family in the home community.
Remittances then take on a different set of motivations. Collective 
remittances are fundamentally a social process, as they are collected 
by an organization in the destination and sent for projects that benefit 
more than one family in the home community. While migrants still send 
money to their spouses or parents, they also send money through the 
hometown associations for the betterment of the home community. The 
hometown association’s stated motivation for this type of remittance 
is care for the home community and a desire to improve the lives of 
those remaining there. However, studies also show that the set of social 
relationships among and between migrant and nonmigrant community 
members structures remittance behavior. Migrants remit to increase 
their social status among migrants and nonmigrants alike; indeed, the 
dense network of social ties between migrants and nonmigrants in this 
type of migration stream ensures that information is quickly transmitted 
between these groups. Migrants also remit in order to increase the status 
and access to resources of their extended family in the home commu-
nity (Osili 2004), and in order to ensure their continued membership in 
the community, which is called the option to return (Roberts and Morris 
2003).
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An example of this type of remittance comes from a study that 
VanWey, Tucker, and McConnell (2005) completed on remittances to 
four communities in the central valleys of the state of Oaxaca, Mexico. 
These communities are unusual for Mexico (though not for Oaxaca) 
in their system of governance. The four communities are all managed 
under a system called usos	y	costumbres, by which natural resources 
are communally owned and all adult male community members have a 
responsibility for the management of these resources and for the gover-
nance of the community. They contribute their labor for the maintenance 
of communal resources (and community infrastructure) in the form of 
workdays called tequio and must on a regular basis assume positions in 
community government, called cargos, for a few years at a time. These 
traditional (based on indigenous systems) governance institutions struc-
ture the collective remittances received by these communities.
Migrants from these communities are usually men traveling alone 
or in groups (often leaving their wives and children in the home com-
munity) or nuclear families traveling together. Within Mexico, migrants 
mostly travel to Oaxaca City or to Mexico City; in the United States, 
they mostly travel to southern California. They migrate largely to ob-
tain better-paying jobs in migration destinations, with the goal of im-
proving their own and their families’ standards of living. Virtually all 
of the migrants remit some money to family members, presumably for 
the reasons described above (though we did not study this). However, 
in some of the communities they also send money for missed tequios, 
for community festivals, and for development projects initiated by the 
origin community.
The primary motivation of these migrants for remitting is a desire 
to maintain their position and membership in the home community. The 
obligation to remit is framed as both a moral responsibility and a prac-
tical way to avoid adverse consequences for one’s remaining family 
members. As a respondent in Sierra Alta notes, “Supposedly it [paying 
for missed tequios] is voluntary, so it isn’t obligatory. More than any-
thing, people here are very conscientious . . . We aren’t obligated, but 
the majority of the migrants would feel bad to come back and not give 
something . . . So it’s really a moral issue.”
The home community also uses the threat of restricting access to 
services or to the benefits of communally owned resources to encour-
age payment. The president of the Committee on Communal Resources 
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in San Timoteo, one of our study communities, reported, “In the end, 
what the municipio opts to do is to await the moment in which it can lay 
down the law. That moment comes when someone needs [the services 
of] the commission. For example, someone says, ‘You have to put in a 
water line.’ Well, we’re going to do it, but [I reply], ‘If you want water, 
then you owe me five tequios that are worth this much, so you have to 
pay that much.’ And that’s how we do it.”
This motivation explains the variation in the levels of remittance 
we see sent to the different study communities. Table 7.1 shows the 
results of our analyses of interview transcripts. The communities that 
were more strongly organized under the usos	 y	 costumbres system, 
with more clearly delineated responsibilities and strictly enforced fines, 
also received more remittances from migrants. This was unrelated to 
whether the migrants had gone to other parts of Mexico or to the United 
States. Thus, stronger community institutions mean that the migrants 
must remit in order to maintain their community membership and the 
option of returning to the community.
THE PoWER oF HoME AND ITS IMPLICATIoNS FoR 
ECoNoMIC DEvELoPMENT
These examples all show the importance of social institutions in 
the home community and the home country in structuring the decisions 
of migrants about remittances. That is to say, they all show the pow-
er of home over migrants. The rights and responsibilities of men and 
SOURCE: Adapted from VanWey, Tucker, and McConnell (2005).
Table 7.1  Strength of Institutions, Migration, and Remittances for Study 
Communities, oaxaca, Mexico, 2002
Community
Strength of 
institutions Migration to U.S.
Remittances to 
community
Sierra Alta High Low High
San Matias High High High
Cerro Verde Intermediate Low Low
San Timoteo Low High Low
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women, parents and children, determine their opportunities for migra-
tion and the amount and reasons they remit. The political institutions 
in the home community determine the obligations that the migrant has 
to the home community in order to guarantee the social standing of the 
remaining family members and his or her own option for return. What 
initially appears as an economic decision requires a consideration of 
social institutions.
Given this, migration researchers need to account for these institu-
tions in order to understand empirical results regarding the processes 
of migration and remittance. Beyond that, we need to theorize on the 
importance of social institutions. I have provided here a basic typology 
from my work and that of others, but further theoretical work needs to 
be done to develop the relationship that exists between migration, re-
mittances, and a variety of social institutions, in order to move beyond 
an after-the-fact interpretation of results as showing the institutional ef-
fects. This theoretical development will also show whether these three 
categories of migration and remittance systems show the complete vari-
ability, or whether additional categories are needed. Furthermore, it will 
allow us to develop and test hypotheses about the transition from one 
migration-remittance system to another.
Understanding the effects of institutions and the type of migration 
will allow us to understand and predict the effects of remittances on 
economic development. The first type of migration and remittance (mi-
grant male household heads) is essential for the well-being of families 
in migrant-sending communities. However, it has a debatable impact 
on economic development in sending communities. Many studies show 
that the vast majority of the money brought home by these men, or sent 
home to similar communities, is spent on current expenses or homes 
(considered consumption expenses rather than productive investments). 
Yet a review of studies by Taylor (1999) argues that even money spent 
on consumption will have positive effects on the economy. Remittances 
spent on consumption free up other resources for productive invest-
ment, according to studies of the effects of remittances on all types of 
spending by households. Additionally, remittances spent on consump-
tion in local communities represent a sizable amount of money and can 
drive economic growth by increasing demand for locally or regional-
ly produced goods and services (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996; 
Taylor 1999; World Bank 2005).
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Remittances that are intergenerational transfers from migrant chil-
dren to their parents have mixed implications for economic develop-
ment. They go to parents to support their needs but are likely to come 
at a time when the parents are not making investments in new land, 
new technology, or other sorts of capital. The immediate use of these 
remittances is more likely to be for consumption, but again this might 
have multiplier effects. Thus, this type of remittance has the potential 
to bring about economic growth as long as it lasts. The long-term im-
pacts are limited by the lack of productive investment (meaning that the 
remittances will not have long-term payoffs) and by the time-limited 
nature of the remittances. Remittances that are used to support parents 
will obviously not outlast the lives of the parents.
Collective remittances have the most immediate potential for posi-
tively affecting economic development. These monies can be used to 
invest in infrastructure (roads, electricity, schools, sanitation, etc.) that 
will improve the health and productivity of community residents and 
potentially allow them to develop or attract businesses. While some 
past research has suggested that collective remittances do not fund proj-
ects desired by the home community (as opposed to projects desired by 
the migrants), our study shows that home communities can initiate proj-
ects and obtain money for them from migrants. In communities such as 
our study communities, the money can be (and has been) invested in 
community enterprises that bring additional income and employment to 
community residents. In this way, remittances might be able to improve 
home communities to such an extent that future migration would be less 
desirable.
Further theoretical as well as empirical development of this mi-
gration-remittance system typology will allow researchers to predict 
the future volume and effects of remittances on home communities. If 
communities move in a rough progression from male heads of house-
hold being pioneer migrants to children migrating in a fully developed 
multilocal social field that includes hometown associations and an in-
stitutionalized migration process, we can then predict a progression of 
effects on local economic development. Initially this progression will 
be characterized by relatively low levels of remittances (because of the 
small number of migrants), and these remittances will be used for both 
consumption and investment by nuclear families who are still rooted in 
the community. These remittances not only will have multiplier effects 
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because of consumption spending, but they will directly increase pro-
ductivity by allowing investments of various types. Subsequent to this, 
remittances to parents will be used primarily for consumption and will 
only last as long as the parents are living and the children are obligated 
to support them (for example, they might stop when the children them-
selves marry or have children). The economic effects of these remit-
tances will occur primarily through consumption spending and multi-
plier effects. The volume of these remittances may also be higher, given 
the larger number of migrants participating in the migration stream over 
time. Finally, the remittances within the fully developed system bypass 
(or supplement) remittances to families in their economic effects. The 
fundamental change at this stage in the progression is that the remit-
tances support the production of public goods, which benefits families 
with and without migrants. This type of remittance has the possibility of 
eventually evening the standards of living and the life chances of these 
two groups.
Note
Parts of this chapter are based on empirical work conducted with Catherine Tucker and 
Eileen McConnell, funded in part by the Center for the Study of Institutions, Popula-
tion, and Environmental Change and by the College of Arts and Sciences at Indiana 
University. Other parts are based on dissertation work conducted with support from the 
Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (through 
a National Institute for Child Health and Human Development training grant). The 
author also thanks Jorge Chapa, Dennis Conway, Richard Jones, Enrico Marcelli, Una 
Osili, Susan Pozo, and participants in a miniconference on transnational connectedness 
at Indiana University, April 2006, for comments on earlier versions of this work.
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